** This is one of the most foundational documents I have ever read. I would recommend ANYONE studying this document if you’d like to understand where the idea behind our First Amendment came from. I don’t think it’s an accident that it is the First, and greatest Amendment. If you’d like to know where it came from, read (and study) this. **
1689
Translated by William Popple
Honoured Sir,
Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual
toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must
needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief
characteristic mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast of
the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship;
others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of
their faith — for everyone is orthodox to himself — these things, and all
others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and
empire over one another than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never
so true a claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of charity,
meekness, and good-will in general towards all mankind, even to those that
are not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian
himself. “The kings of the Gentiles exercise leadership over them,” said our
Saviour to his disciples, “but ye shall not be so.”[1] The business of true
religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted in order to the
erecting of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical
dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to the regulating
of men’s lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will
list himself under the banner of Christ, must, in the first place and above
all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is in vain for any man
to unsurp the name of Christian, without holiness of life, purity of
manners, benignity and meekness of spirit. “Let everyone that nameth the
name of Christ, depart from iniquity.”[2] “Thou, when thou art converted,
strengthen thy brethren,” said our Lord to Peter.[3] It would, indeed, be
very hard for one that appears careless about his own salvation to persuade
me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that
those should sincerely and heartily apply themselves to make other people
Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian religion in their own
hearts. If the Gospel and the apostles may be credited, no man can be a
Christian without charity and without that faith which works, not by force,
but by love. Now, I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute,
torment, destroy, and kill other men upon pretence of religion, whether they
do it out of friendship and kindness towards them or no? And I shall then
indeed, and not until then, believe they do so, when I shall see those fiery
zealots correcting, in the same manner, their friends and familiar
acquaintance for the manifest sins they commit against the precepts of the
Gospel; when I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of
their own communion that are tainted with enormous vices and without
amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see them thus
express their love and desire of the salvation of their souls by the
infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be
out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men’s souls that
they deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments,
starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take away
their lives — I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians and
procure their salvation, why then do they suffer whoredom, fraud, malice,
and such-like enormities, which (according to the apostle)[4] manifestly
relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and abound amongst
their flocks and people? These, and such-like things, are certainly more
contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the Church, and to the
salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical
decisions, or separation from public worship, whilst accompanied with
innocence of life. Why, then, does this burning zeal for God, for the
Church, and for the salvation of souls — burning I say, literally, with
fire and faggot — pass by those moral vices and wickednesses, without any
chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically opposite
to the profession of Christianity, and bend all its nerves either to the
introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of opinions, which for
the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity
of ordinary understandings? Which of the parties contending about these
things is in the right, which of them is guilty of schism or heresy, whether
those that domineer or those that suffer, will then at last be manifest when
the causes of their separation comes to be judged of He, certainly, that
follows Christ, embraces His doctrine, and bears His yoke, though he forsake
both father and mother, separate from the public assemblies and ceremonies
of his country, or whomsoever or whatsoever else he relinquishes, will not
then be judged a heretic.
Now, though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be
never so obstructive of the salvation of souls; yet, nevertheless, adultery,
fornication, uncleanliness, lasciviousness, idolatry, and such-like things,
cannot be denied to be works of the flesh, concerning which the apostle has
expressly declared that “they who do them shall not inherit the kingdom of
God.”[5] Whosoever, therefore, is sincerely solicitous about the kingdom of
God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men,
ought to apply himself with no less care and industry to the rooting out of
these immoralities than to the extirpation of sects. But if anyone do
otherwise, and whilst he is cruel and implacable towards those that differ
from him in opinion, he be indulgent to such iniquities and immoralities as
are unbecoming the name of a Christian, let such a one talk never so much of
the Church, he plainly demonstrates by his actions that it is another
kingdom he aims at and not the advancement of the kingdom of God.
That any man should think fit to cause another man — whose salvation he
heartily desires — to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted
state, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any other
also. But nobody, surely, will ever believe that such a carriage can proceed
from charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain that men ought to be
compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to
this or that exterior worship, without any regard had unto their morals; if
anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith, by
forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to
practise things that the Gospel does not permit, it cannot be doubted indeed
but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same
profession with himself; but that he principally intends by those means to
compose a truly Christian Church is altogether incredible. It is not,
therefore, to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the
advancement of the true religion, and of the Church of Christ, make use of
arms that do not belong to the Christian warfare. If, like the Captain of
our salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls, they would tread in
the steps and follow the perfect example of that Prince of Peace, who sent
out His soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them into His
Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force, but
prepared with the Gospel of peace and with the exemplary holiness of their
conversation. This was His method. Though if infidels were to be converted
by force, if those that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off
from their errors by armed soldiers, we know very well that it was much more
easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of
the Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.
The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so
agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of
mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive
the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not here tax
the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of others.
These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be
perfectly freed; but yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of,
without covering them with some specious colour; and so pretend to
commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions.
But, however, that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and
unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public weal and
observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may
not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a word, that
none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty
and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship
of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just
bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there
can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between
those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment
for the interest of men’s souls, and, on the other side, a care of the
commonwealth.
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the
procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and
the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture,
and the like.
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal
laws, to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his
subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this
life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity,
established for the preservation of those things, his presumption is to be
checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation or
diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and
ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be
punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his
liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and
strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that
violate any other man’s rights.
Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these
civil concernments, and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded
and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither
can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls, these
following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.
First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate,
any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God;
because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man
over another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such power be
vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people, because no man can so
far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice
of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or
worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to
the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in
the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without
believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we
conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true
and the other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far
from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For
in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion,
I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be
displeasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of
hypocrisy and contempt of His Divine Majesty.
In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil
magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true and
saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which
nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by
outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of
that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward
judgement that they have framed of things.
It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and,
thereby; draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their
salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In
teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he may
certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy does not oblige him
to put off either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing to persuade,
another to command; one thing to press with arguments, another with
penalties. This civil power alone has a right to do; to the other, goodwill
is authority enough. Every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince
another of error, and, by reasoning, to draw him into truth; but to give
laws, receive obedience, and compel with the sword, belongs to none but the
magistrate. And, upon this ground, I affirm that the magistrate’s power
extends not to the establishing of any articles of faith, or forms of
worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without
penalties, and penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because
they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the profession of any
articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship (as has
been already said), can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the
truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other unto God be thoroughly
believed by those that so profess and practise. But penalties are no way
capable to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence that can work
a change in men’s opinions; which light can in no manner proceed from
corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties.
In the third place, the care of the salvation of men’s souls cannot belong
to the magistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of
penalties were capable to convince and change men’s minds, yet would not
that help at all to the salvation of their souls. For there being but one
truth, one way to heaven, what hope is there that more men would be led into
it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under the
necessity to quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of
their own consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to the will of
their governors and to the religion which either ignorance, ambition, or
superstition had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born?
In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the
princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests, the
narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone would be in the
right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following
their princes in the ways that lead to destruction; and that which heightens
the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would owe their
eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity.
These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the
same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude that all the power of
civil government relates only to men’s civil interests, is confined to the
care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to
come.
Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a
voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in
order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge
acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.
I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any
church; otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by the
same right of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone would hold
his faith by the same tenure he does his lands, than which nothing can be
imagined more absurd. Thus, therefore, that matter stands. No man by nature
is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself
voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that
profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hope of
salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion, so
it can be the only reason of his stay there. For if afterwards he discover
anything either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the worship of
that society to which he has joined himself, why should it not be as free for
him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a religious society can be
tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of
eternal life. A church, then, is a society of members voluntarily uniting to
that end.
It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto
what laws it is subject.
Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion
instituted, whether of philosophers for learning, of merchants for commerce,
or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and discourse, no church or
company, I say, can in the least subsist and hold together, but will
presently dissolve and break in pieces, unless it be regulated by some laws,
and the members all consent to observe some order. Place and time of meeting
must be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding members must be
established; distinction of officers, and putting things into a regular
course, and suchlike, cannot be omitted. But since the joining together of
several members into this church-society, as has already been demonstrated,
is absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of
making its laws can belong to none but the society itself; or, at least
(which is the same thing), to those whom the society by common consent has
authorised thereunto.
Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be said to be a true
church unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter, with ruling authority
derived from the very apostles, and continued down to the present times by
an uninterrupted succession.
To these I answer: In the first place, let them show me the edict by which
Christ has imposed that law upon His Church. And let not any man think me
impertinent, if in a thing of this consequence I require that the terms of
that edict be very express and positive; for the promise He has made us,[6]
that “wheresoever two or three are gathered together” in His name, He will
be in the midst of them, seems to imply the contrary. Whether such an
assembly want anything necessary to a true church, pray do you consider.
Certain I am that nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of souls,
which is sufficient to our purpose.
Next, pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst even
those who lay so much stress upon the Divine institution and continued
succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now, their very
dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating and,
consequently, allows a liberty of choosing that which upon consideration we
prefer.
And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler in their
church, established by such a long series of succession as they judge
necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to
that society in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are
necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty
will be preserved on all sides, and no man will have a legislator imposed
upon him but whom himself has chosen.
But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them
here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ to
make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such things
only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express
words, to be necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be not more
agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their own
inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine
authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary
to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do
either not mention, or at least not expressly command? Whosoever requires
those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not
require in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed constitute a
society accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage; but how that
can be called the Church of Christ which is established upon laws that are
not His, and which excludes such persons from its communion as He will one
day receive into the Kingdom of Heaven, I understand not. But this being not
a proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church, I will only
mind those that contend so earnestly for the decrees of their own society,
and that cry out continually, “The Church! the Church!” with as much noise,
and perhaps upon the same principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for
their Diana; this, I say, I desire to mind them of, that the Gospel
frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer
persecution; but that the Church of Christ should persecute others, and
force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could
never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.
The end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public
worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All
discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical
laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this
society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is
here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs
wholly to the civil magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is
subject to his jurisdiction.
But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be
established, if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I
answer: They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such
things, whereof the external profession and observation — if not proceeding
from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind — is altogether
useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are
to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If
by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous
convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn
and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation,
should be cast out and separated from the society. This is the last and
utmost force of ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can thereby be
inflicted than that, the relation ceasing between the body and the member
which is cut off. The person so condemned ceases to be a part of that
church.
These things being thus determined, let us inquire, in the next place: How
far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by
it?
And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to
retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues
obstinately to offend against the laws of the society. For, these being the
condition of communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them
were permitted without any animadversion the society would immediately be
thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such cases care is to be taken
that the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with
it no rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person may any wise
be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often been said)
belongs only to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons at any time to
use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust violence.
Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of
any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All those things belong
to the civil government and are under the magistrate’s protection. The whole
force of excommunication consists only in this: that, the resolution of the
society in that respect being declared, the union that was between the body
and some member comes thereby to be dissolved; and, that relation ceasing,
the participation of some certain things which the society communicated to
its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes also to cease.
For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the
church minister’s refusing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of
the Lord’s Supper, which was not bought with his but other men’s money.
Secondly, no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another
person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion.
All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a denizen,
are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of
religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be
Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow
measures of bare justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to
it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that natural
fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right
way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to
punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be
miserable in that which is to come.
What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing
from one another in religion, I understand also of particular churches which
stand, as it were, in the same relation to each other as private persons
among themselves: nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over
any other; no, not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens)
comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can
give no new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So
that, whether the magistrate join himself to any church, or separate from
it, the church remains always as it was before — a free and voluntary
society. It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate’s
coming to it, nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication
by his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a
spontaneous society — that it has power to remove any of its members who
transgress the rules of its institution; but it cannot, by the accession of
any new members, acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not
joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendship are always
mutually to be observed by particular churches, in the same manner as by
private persons, without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over
one another.
That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let us suppose two
churches — the one of Arminians, the other of Calvinists — residing in the
city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has
right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as
we see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some
doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks, in the meanwhile, silently stand
by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against
Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the
other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what
right? It will be answered, undoubtedly, that it is the orthodox church
which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is,
in great and specious words, to say just nothing at all. For every church is
orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any
church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things
it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy between these churches
about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on
both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or
elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined. The decision
of that question belongs only to the Supreme judge of all men, to whom also
alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous. In the meanwhile, let those
men consider how heinously they sin, who, adding injustice, if not to their
error, yet certainly to their pride, do rashly and arrogantly take upon them
to misuse the servants of another master, who are not at all accountable to
them.
Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches
were in the right, there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any
right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction in
worldly matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to
convince men’s minds of error, and inform them of the truth. Let us suppose,
nevertheless, that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and
to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise
the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say that any right can be
derived unto a Christian church over its brethren from a Turkish emperor? An
infidel, who has himself no authority to punish Christians for the articles
of their faith, cannot confer such an authority upon any society of
Christians, nor give unto them a right which he has not himself. This would
be the case at Constantinople; and the reason of the thing is the same in
any Christian kingdom. The civil power is the same in every place. Nor can
that power, in the hands of a Christian prince, confer any greater authority
upon the Church than in the hands of a heathen; which is to say, just none
at all.
Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed and lamented that the most violent
of these defenders of the truth, the opposers of errors, the exclaimers
against schism do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God, with which
they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the civil magistrate
on their side. But so soon as ever court favour has given them the better
end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves the stronger, then
presently peace and charity are to be laid aside. Otherwise they are
religiously to be observed. Where they have not the power to carry on
persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live upon fair terms
and preach up toleration. When they are not strengthened with the civil
power, then they can bear most patiently and unmovedly the contagion of
idolatry, superstition, and heresy in their neighbourhood; of which on other
occasions the interest of religion makes them to be extremely apprehensive.
They do not forwardly attack those errors which are in fashion at court or
are countenanced by the government. Here they can be content to spare their
arguments; which yet (with their leave) is the only right method of
propagating truth, which has no such way of prevailing as when strong
arguments and good reason are joined with the softness of civility and good
usage.
Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor
even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and
worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are of
another opinion would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious a
seed of discord and war, how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds,
rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and
security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or
preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is
founded in grace and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.
In the third place, let us see what the duty of toleration requires from
those who are distinguished from the rest of mankind (from the laity, as
they please to call us) by some ecclesiastical character and office; whether
they be bishops, priests, presbyters, ministers, or however else dignified
or distinguished. It is not my business to inquire here into the original of
the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that, whencesoever
their authority be sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it ought to be
confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner be
extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing absolutely
separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides
are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things
most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their
original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely
different from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical
office he be dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church
and faith either of liberty or of any part of his worldly goods upon the
account of that difference between them in religion. For whatsoever is not
lawful to the whole Church cannot by any ecclesiastical right become lawful
to any of its members.
But this is not all. It is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from
violence and rapine and all manner of persecution. He that pretends to be a
successor of the apostles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is
obliged also to admonish his hearers of the duties of peace and goodwill
towards all men, as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards
those that differ from them in faith and worship as well as towards those
that agree with them therein. And he ought industriously to exhort all men,
whether private persons or magistrates (if any such there be in his church),
to charity, meekness, and toleration, and diligently endeavour to ally and
temper all that heat and unreasonable averseness of mind which either any
man’s fiery zeal for his own sect or the craft of others has kindled against
dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how happy and how great would
be the fruit, both in Church and State, if the pulpits everywhere sounded
with this doctrine of peace and toleration, lest I should seem to reflect
too severely upon those men whose dignity I desire not to detract from, nor
would have it diminished either by others or themselves. But this I say,
that thus it ought to be. And if anyone that professes himself to be a
minister of the Word of God, a preacher of the gospel of peace, teach
otherwise, he either understands not or neglects the business of his calling
and shall one day give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace. If
Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all manner of
revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries, how much
more ought they who suffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, forbear
violence and abstain from all manner of ill-usage towards those from whom
they have received none! This caution and temper they ought certainly to use
towards those. who mind only their own business and are solicitous for
nothing but that (whatever men think of them) they may worship God in that
manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have
the strongest hopes of eternal salvation. In private domestic affairs, in
the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man
may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes
best. No man complains of the ill-management of his neighbour’s affairs. No
man is angry with another for an error committed in sowing his land or in
marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his
substance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or build, or make whatsoever
expenses he pleases, nobody murmurs, nobody controls him; he has his
liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not there
conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies, or if he brings
not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the
other congregation, this immediately causes an uproar. The neighbourhood is
filled with noise and clamour. Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so
great a crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from
violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and the poor man be,
according to form, condemned to the loss of liberty, goods, or life. Oh,
that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would apply themselves with
all the strength of arguments that they are able to the confounding of men’s
errors! But let them spare their persons. Let them not supply their want of
reasons with the instruments of force, which belong to another jurisdiction
and do ill become a Churchman’s hands. Let them not call in the magistrate’s
authority to the aid of their eloquence or learning, lest perhaps, whilst
they pretend only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing
nothing but fire and sword, betray their ambition and show that what they
desire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to persuade men
of sense that he who with dry eyes and satisfaction of mind can deliver his
brother to the executioner to be burnt alive, does sincerely and heartily
concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to
come.
In the last place, let us now consider what is the magistrate’s duty in the
business of toleration, which certainly is very considerable.
We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the
magistrate. Not a magisterial care, I mean (if I may so call it), which
consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a
charitable care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading,
cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore, of every man’s soul
belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect
the care of his soul? I answer: What if he neglect the care of his health or
of his estate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the
magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law
that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as is
possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud
and violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence or
ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be rich
or healthful whether he will or no. Nay, God Himself will not save men
against their wills. Let us suppose, however, that some prince were desirous
to force his subjects to accumulate riches, or to preserve the health and
strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law that they must consult
none but Roman physicians, and shall everyone be bound to live according to
their prescriptions? What, shall no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is
prepared either in the Vatican, suppose, or in a Geneva shop? Or, to make
these subjects rich, shall they all be obliged by law to become merchants or
musicians? Or, shall everyone turn victualler, or smith, because there are
some that maintain their families plentifully and grow rich in those
professions? But, it may be said, there are a thousand ways to wealth, but
one only way to heaven. It is well said, indeed, especially by those that
plead for compelling men into this or the other way. For if there were
several ways that led thither, there would not be so much as a pretence left
for compulsion. But now, if I be marching on with my utmost vigour in that
way which, according to the sacred geography, leads straight to Jerusalem,
why am I beaten and ill-used by others because, perhaps, I wear not buskins;
because my hair is not of the right cut; because, perhaps, I have not been
dipped in the right fashion; because I eat flesh upon the road, or some
other food which agrees with my stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways,
which seem unto me to lead into briars or precipices; because, amongst the
several paths that are in the same road, I choose that to walk in which
seems to be the straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep company
with some travellers that are less grave and others that are more sour than
they ought to be; or, in fine, because I follow a guide that either is, or
is not, clothed in white, or crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we consider
right, we shall find that, for the most part, they are such frivolous things
as these that (without any prejudice to religion or the salvation of souls,
if not accompanied with superstition or hypocrisy) might either be observed
or omitted. I say they are such-like things as these which breed implacable
enmities amongst Christian brethren, who are all agreed in the substantial
and truly fundamental part of religion.
But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all things that are not of
their mode, that from these circumstances are different ends. What shall we
conclude from thence? There is only one of these which is the true way to
eternal happiness: but in this great variety of ways that men follow, it is
still doubted which is the right one. Now, neither the care of the
commonwealth, nor the right enacting of laws, does discover this way that
leads to heaven more certainly to the magistrate than every private man’s
search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a weak body, sunk under a
languishing disease, for which (I suppose) there is one only remedy, but
that unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magistrate to prescribe me a
remedy, because there is but one, and because it is unknown? Because there is
but one way for me to escape death, will it therefore be safe for me to do
whatsoever the magistrate ordains? Those things that every man ought
sincerely to inquire into himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his
own endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon as the
peculiar possession of any sort of men. Princes, indeed, are born superior
unto other men in power, but in nature equal. Neither the right nor the art
of ruling does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of
other things, and least of all of true religion. For if it were so, how
could it come to pass that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as
they do in religious matters? But let us grant that it is probable the way
to eternal life may be better known by a prince than by his subjects, or at
least that in this incertitude of things the safest and most commodious way
for private persons is to follow his dictates. You will say: “What then?” If
he should bid you follow merchandise for your livelihood, would you decline
that course for fear it should not succeed? I answer: I would turn merchant
upon the prince’s command, because, in case I should have ill-success in
trade, he is abundantly able to make up my loss some other way. If it be
true, as he pretends, that he desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can
set me up again when unsuccessful voyages have broken me. But this is not
the case in the things that regard the life to come; if there I take a wrong
course, if in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the magistrate’s
power to repair my loss, to ease my suffering, nor to restore me in any
measure, much less entirely, to a good estate. What security can be given
for the Kingdom of Heaven?
Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this infallible judgement,
that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the
civil magistrate, but in the Church. What the Church has determined, that
the civil magistrate orders to be observed; and he provides by his authority
that nobody shall either act or believe in the business of religion
otherwise than the Church teaches. So that the judgement of those things is
in the Church; the magistrate himself yields obedience thereunto and
requires the like obedience from others. I answer: Who sees not how
frequently the name of the Church, which was venerable in time of the
apostles, has been made use of to throw dust in the people’s eyes in the
following ages? But, however, in the present case it helps us not. The one
only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate
than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide,
who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is
less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many kings of
the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus blindly
following, had not fallen into idolatry and thereby into destruction? Yet,
nevertheless, you bid me be of good courage and tell me that all is now safe
and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his
own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the Church. Of
what Church, I beseech you? of that, certainly, which likes him best. As if
he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or the other
Church, did not interpose his own judgement in the matter. What difference
is there whether he lead me himself, or deliver me over to be led by others?
I depend both ways upon his will, and it is he that determines both ways of
my eternal state. Would an Israelite that had worshipped Baal upon the
command of his king have been in any better condition because somebody had
told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor
commanded anything to be done by his subjects in divine worship but what was
approved by the counsel of priests, and declared to be of divine right by
the doctors of their Church? If the religion of any Church become,
therefore, true and saving, because the head of that sect, the prelates and
priests, and those of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might,
extol and praise it, what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false,
and destructive? I am doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I
am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the Papists, or Lutherans;
will it be ever a jot safer for me to join either unto the one or the other
of those Churches, upon the magistrate’s command, because he commands
nothing in religion but by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that
Church?
But, to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the Church (if a
convention of clergymen, making canons, must be called by that name) is for
the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by the
Church. How the Church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and Arian
emperors is very well known. Or if those things be too remote, our modern
English history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of Henry VIII,
Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy changed
their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worship, everything
according to the inclination of those kings and queens. Yet were those kings
and queens of such different minds in point of religion, and enjoined
thereupon such different things, that no man in his wits (I had almost said
none but an atheist) will presume to say that any sincere and upright
worshipper of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their several decrees.
To conclude, it is the same thing whether a king that prescribes laws to
another man’s religion pretend to do it by his own judgement, or by the
ecclesiastical authority and advice of others. The decisions of churchmen,
whose differences and disputes are sufficiently known, cannot be any sounder
or safer than his; nor can all their suffrages joined together add a new
strength to the civil power. Though this also must be taken notice of –
that princes seldom have any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that
are not favourers of their own faith and way of worship.
But, after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely determines
this controversy, is this: Although the magistrate’s opinion in religion be
sound, and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet, if I be not
thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me
in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates
of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may
grow rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some
disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot be saved by a
religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an
unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man’s profession. Faith
only and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God.
The most likely and most approved remedy can have no effect upon the
patient, if his stomach reject it as soon as taken; and you will in vain
cram a medicine down a sick man’s throat, which his particular constitution
will be sure to turn into poison. In a word, whatsoever may be doubtful in
religion, yet this at least is certain, that no religion which I believe not
to be true can be either true or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do
princes compel their subjects to come into their Church communion, under
pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of their own
accord, if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great
soever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and charity, and concern
for the salvation of men’s souls, men cannot be forced to be saved whether
they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their
own consciences.
Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in
matters of religion, let us now consider what they are to do. All men know
and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped; why otherwise do
they compel one another unto the public assemblies? Men, therefore,
constituted in this liberty are to enter into some religious society, that
they meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world
that they worship God and offer unto His Divine Majesty such service as they
themselves are not ashamed of and such as they think not unworthy of Him,
nor unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by the purity of doctrine,
holiness of life, and decent form of worship, they may draw others unto the
love of the true religion, and perform such other things in religion as
cannot be done by each private man apart.
These religious societies I call Churches; and these, I say, the magistrate
ought to tolerate, for the business of these assemblies of the people is
nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of — I
mean the salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any difference
between the National Church and other separated congregations.
But as in every Church there are two things especially to be considered –
the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of
things must be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of
toleration may the more clearly be understood.
Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the magistrate
has no power to enforce by law, either in his own Church, or much less in
another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of
God. And this, not only because these Churches are free societies, but
because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is only so far
justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable
unto Him. Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith is neither
well in itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose such things,
therefore, upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to
command them to offend God, which, considering that the end of all religion
is to please Him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end,
appears to be absurd beyond expression.
But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny unto the magistrate
all manner of power about indifferent things, which, if it be not granted,
the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away. No, I readily grant
that indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are subjected to the
legislative power. But it does not therefore follow that the magistrate may
ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The
public good is the rule and measure of all law-making. If a thing be not
useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not
presently be established by law.
And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are
brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out of the reach of
the magistrate’s jurisdiction, because in that use they have no connection
at all with civil affairs. The only business of the Church is the salvation
of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that
this or the other ceremony be there made use of. Neither the use nor the
omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either
advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man. For example,
let it be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an
indifferent thing, let it be granted also that the magistrate understand
such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease the
children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken
care of by a law. In that case he may order it to be done. But will any one
therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to ordain by law that all
children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the
purification of their souls? The extreme difference of these two cases is
visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the
child of a Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a
Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge
that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him, against his
own opinion, to practise in his religion a thing that is in its nature
indifferent, how can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a
Christian?
Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human
authority, be made any part of the worship of God — for this very reason:
because they are indifferent. For, since indifferent things are not capable,
by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the Deity, no human power or
authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable
them to do it. In the common affairs of life that use of indifferent things
which God has not forbidden is free and lawful, and therefore in those
things human authority has place. But it is not so in matters of religion.
Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as
they are instituted by God Himself and as He, by some positive command, has
ordained them to be made a part of that worship which He will vouchsafe to
accept at the hands of poor sinful men. Nor, when an incensed Deity shall
ask us, “Who has required these, or such-like things at your hands?” will it
be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them. If civil
jurisdiction extend thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into
religion? What hodgepodge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions,
built upon the magistrate’s authority, might not (against conscience) be
imposed upon the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these
ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as
are in their own nature indifferent; nor are they sinful upon any other
account than because God is not the author of them. The sprinkling of water
and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the
ordinary occasions of life altogether indifferent. Will any man, therefore,
say that these things could have been introduced into religion and made a
part of divine worship if not by divine institution? If any human authority
or civil power could have done this, why might it not also enjoin the eating
of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship?
Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches, and expiations by
water or fire, and abundance more of this kind? But these things, how
indifferent soever they be in common uses, when they come to be annexed unto
divine worship, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God as
the sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so abominable? What difference is
there between a dog and a goat, in respect of the divine nature, equally and
infinitely distant from all affinity with matter, unless it be that God
required the use of one in His worship and not of the other? We see,
therefore, that indifferent things, how much soever they be under the power
of the civil magistrate, yet cannot, upon that pretence, be introduced into
religion and imposed upon religious assemblies, because, in the worship of
God, they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God does it with
design to please Him and procure His favour. But that cannot be done by him
who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that which he knows will
be displeasing to Him, because not commanded by Himself. This is not to
please God, or appease his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him
by a manifest contempt, which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature
and end of worship.
But it will be here asked: “If nothing belonging to divine worship be left
to human discretion, how is it then that Churches themselves have the power
of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like?” To
this I answer that in religious worship we must distinguish between what is
part of the worship itself and what is but a circumstance. That is a part of
the worship which is believed to be appointed by God and to be well-pleasing
to Him, and therefore that is necessary. Circumstances are such things
which, though in general they cannot be separated from worship, yet the
particular instances or modifications of them are not determined, and
therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort are the time and place of
worship, habit and posture of him that worships. These are circumstances,
and perfectly indifferent, where God has not given any express command about
them. For example: amongst the Jews the time and place of their worship and
the habits of those that officiated in it were not mere circumstances, but a
part of the worship itself, in which, if anything were defective, or
different from the institution, they could not hope that it would be
accepted by God. But these, to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel,
are mere circumstances of worship, which the prudence of every Church may
bring into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order,
decency, and edification. But, even under the Gospel, those who believe the
first or the seventh day to be set apart by God, and consecrated still to
His worship, to them that portion of time is not a simple circumstance, but
a real part of Divine worship, which can neither be changed nor neglected.
In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the
use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church, so neither has he any power
to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received,
approved, and practised by any Church; because, if he did so, he would
destroy the Church itself: the end of whose institution is only to worship
God with freedom after its own manner.
You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to
sacrifice infants, or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused)
lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practise any
other such heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them,
because they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer: No. These
things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private
house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God, or in any
religious meeting. But, indeed, if any people congregated upon account of
religion should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to
be prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill his
calf at home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is
thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man’s goods. And for the
same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the
doing so be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that do
it. The part of the magistrate is only to take care that the commonwealth
receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in
life or estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a
sacrifice. But if peradventure such were the state of things that the
interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be
forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle
that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the
magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves
for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the
law is not made about a religious, but a political matter; nor is the
sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.
By this we see what difference there is between the Church and the
Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be prohibited
by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his
subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by
him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully
take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own house, the law
ought not to abridge him of the same liberty in his religious worship;
though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very different and be
there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But
those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their
ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those things ought not
to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought
always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority to the
oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.
It may be said: “What if a Church be idolatrous, is that also to be
tolerated by the magistrate?” I answer: What power can be given to the
magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which may not in
time and place be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it must be
remembered that the civil power is the same everywhere, and the religion of
every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore, such a power be granted
unto the civil magistrate in spirituals as that at Geneva, for example, he
may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there reputed
idolatrous, by the same rule another magistrate, in some neighbouring
country, may oppress the reformed religion and, in India, the Christian. The
civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the
prince’s pleasure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to
introduce anything into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there
can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the same manner be lawful to
alter everything, according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has
framed unto himself. No man whatsoever ought, therefore, to be deprived of
his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion. Not even Americans,
subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or
goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that
they please God in observing the rites of their own country and that they
shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left unto God and
themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An
inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything,
arrive in a Pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the
bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of
life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they
all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The Christian
religion by this means takes root in that country and spreads itself, but
does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition
peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At
length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party
becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken,
all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless
these innocent Pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and the law
of Nature and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say,
unless they will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new and
strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their
forefathers and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then, at last, it appears
what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to
produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls,
serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.
Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by
laws, punishments, fire, and sword, may apply this story to himself. For the
reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither Pagans
there, nor any dissenting Christians here, can, with any right, be deprived
of their worldly goods by the predominating faction of a court-church; nor
are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of
religion in one place more than another.
But idolatry, say some, is a sin and therefore not to be tolerated. If they
said it were therefore to be avoided, the inference were good. But it does
not follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to be punished by the
magistrate. For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his
sword in punishing everything, indifferently, that he takes to be a sin
against God. Covetousness, uncharitableness, idleness, and many other things
are sins by the consent of men, which yet no man ever said were to be
punished by the magistrate. The reason is because they are not prejudicial
to other men’s rights, nor do they break the public peace of societies. Nay,
even the sins of lying and perjury are nowhere punishable by laws; unless,
in certain cases, in which the real turpitude of the thing and the offence
against God are not considered, but only the injury done unto men’s
neighbours and to the commonwealth. And what if in another country, to a
Mahometan or a Pagan prince, the Christian religion seem false and offensive
to God; may not the Christians for the same reason, and after the same
manner, be extirpated there?
But it may be urged farther that, by the law of Moses, idolaters were to be
rooted out. True, indeed, by the law of Moses; but that is not obligatory to
us Christians. Nobody pretends that everything generally enjoined by the law
of Moses ought to be practised by Christians; but there is nothing more
frivolous than that common distinction of moral, judicial, and ceremonial
law, which men ordinarily make use of. For no positive law whatsoever can
oblige any people but those to whom it is given. “Hear, O Israel,”
sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to that
people. And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge
the authority of the law of Moses for the inflicting of capital punishment
upon idolaters. But, however, I will examine this argument a little more
particularly.
The case of idolaters, in respect of the Jewish commonwealth, falls under a
double consideration. The first is of those who, being initiated in the
Mosaical rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards
apostatise from the worship of the God of Israel. These were proceeded
against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high treason. For the
commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute
theocracy; nor was there, or could there be, any difference between that
commonwealth and the Church. The laws established there concerning the
worship of One Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people and a part
of their political government, in which God Himself was the legislator. Now,
if any one can shew me where there is a commonwealth at this time,
constituted upon that foundation, I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical
laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil, and that the subjects
of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict conformity with
that Church by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing under
the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth. There are, indeed, many cities and
kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ, but they have retained
their ancient form of government, with which the law of Christ hath not at
all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good works, they
may obtain eternal life; but He instituted no commonwealth. He prescribed
unto His followers no new and peculiar form of government, nor put He the
sword into any magistrate’s hand, with commission to make use of it in
forcing men to forsake their former religion and receive His.
Secondly, foreigners and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of
Israel were not compelled by force to observe the rites of the Mosaical law;
but, on the contrary, in the very same place where it is ordered that an
Israelite that was an idolater should be put to death,[7] there it is
provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed. I confess that
the seven nations that possessed the land which was promised to the
Israelites were utterly to be cut off; but this was not singly because they
were idolaters. For if that had been the reason, why were the Moabites and
other nations to be spared? No: the reason is this. God being in a peculiar
manner the King of the Jews, He could not suffer the adoration of any other
deity (which was properly an act of high treason against Himself) in the
land of Canaan, which was His kingdom. For such a manifest revolt could no
ways consist with His dominion, which was perfectly political in that
country. All idolatry was, therefore, to be rooted out of the bounds of His
kingdom because it was an acknowledgment of another god, that is say,
another king, against the laws of Empire. The inhabitants were also to be
driven out, that the entire possession of the land might be given to the
Israelites. And for the like reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out
of their countries by the children of Esau and Lot; and their lands, upon
the same grounds, given by God to the invaders.[8] But, though all idolatry
was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater was not
brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole nation of the
Gibeonites, articled with Joshua, and were allowed by treaty; and there were
many captives amongst the Jews who were idolaters. David and Solomon subdued
many countries without the confines of the Land of Promise and carried their
conquests as far as Euphrates. Amongst so many captives taken, so many
nations reduced under their obedience, we find not one man forced into the
Jewish religion and the worship of the true God and punished for idolatry,
though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one, indeed, becoming
a proselyte, desired to be made a denizen of their commonwealth, he was
obliged to submit to their laws; that is, to embrace their religion. But
this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by constraint. He did not
unwillingly submit, to show his obedience, but he sought and solicited for
it as a privilege. And, as soon as he was admitted, he became subject to the
laws of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was forbidden within the
borders of the land of Canaan. But that law (as I have said) did not reach
to any of those regions, however subjected unto the Jews, that were situated
without those bounds.
Thus far concerning outward worship. Let us now consider articles of faith.
The articles of religion are some of them practical and some speculative.
Now, though both sorts consist in the knowledge of truth, yet these
terminate simply in the understanding, those influence the will and manners.
Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith (as they are called)
which are required only to be believed, cannot be imposed on any Church by
the law of the land. For it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws
which are not in men’s power to perform. And to believe this or that to be
true does not depend upon our will. But of this enough has been said
already. “But.” will some say; “let men at least profess that they believe.”
A sweet religion, indeed, that obliges men to dissemble and tell lies, both
to God and man, for the salvation of their souls! If the magistrate thinks
to save men thus, he seems to understand little of the way of salvation. And
if he does it not in order to save them, why is he so solicitous about the
articles of faith as to enact them by a law?
Further, the magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or professing of
any speculative opinions in any Church because they have no manner of
relation to the civil rights of the subjects. If a Roman Catholic believe
that to be really the body of Christ which another man calls bread, he does
no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew do not believe the New
Testament to be the Word of God, he does not thereby alter anything in men’s
civil rights. If a heathen doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to
be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magistrate and the
estates of the people may be equally secure whether any man believe these
things or no. I readily grant that these opinions are false and absurd. But
the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for
the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s
goods and person. And so it ought to be. For the truth certainly would do
well enough if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has
received and, I fear, never will receive much assistance from the power of
great men, to whom she is but rarely known and more rarely welcome. She is
not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance
into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by the assistance of foreign
and borrowed succours. But if Truth makes not her way into the understanding
by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence
can add to her. Thus much for speculative opinions. Let us now proceed to
practical ones.
A good life, in which consist not the least part of religion and true piety,
concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety both of men’s
souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong, therefore, to the
jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and
domestic governor; I mean both of the magistrate and conscience. Here,
therefore, is great danger, lest one of these jurisdictions intrench upon
the other, and discord arise between the keeper of the public peace and the
overseers of souls. But if what has been already said concerning the limits
of both these governments be rightly considered, it will easily remove all
difficulty in this matter.
Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery;
whose happiness depending upon his believing and doing those things in this
life which are necessary to the obtaining of God’s favour, and are
prescribed by God to that end. It follows from thence, first, that the
observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon mankind
and that our utmost care, application, and diligence ought to be exercised
in the search and performance of them; because there is nothing in this
world that is of any consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly,
that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous
opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to
another man’s affairs, therefore, the care of each man’s salvation belongs
only to himself. But I would not have this understood as if I meant hereby
to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce
men from errors, which are indeed the greatest duty of a Christian. Any one
may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the
promoting of another man’s salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be
forborne. Nothing is to be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that
matter to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another,
further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the supreme and
absolute authority of judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody
else is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct
therein.
But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal
lives here upon earth; the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the
duration uncertain, they have need of several outward conveniences to the
support thereof, which are to be procured or preserved by pains and
industry. For those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of
our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer
themselves fit and prepared for our use. This part, therefore, draws on
another care and necessarily gives another employment. But the pravity of
mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of
other men’s labours than take pains to provide for themselves, the necessity
of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already
acquired and also of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may
acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into society with one
another, that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each
other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and
happiness of this life, leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of
his own eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated
by another man’s industry, nor can the loss of it turn to another man’s
prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence.
But, forasmuch as men thus entering into societies, grounded upon their
mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their temporal goods, may,
nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their
fellow citizens, or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of
this evil consists in arms, riches, and multitude of citizens; the remedy of
the other in laws; and the care of all things relating both to one and the
other is committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the
original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the legislative
(which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision
may be made for the security of each man’s private possessions; for the
peace, riches, and public commodities of the whole people; and, as much as
possible, for the increase of their inward strength against foreign
invasions.
These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the
legislative power ought to be directed and by what measures regulated; and
that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society; which is
the sole reason of men’s entering into society, and the only thing they seek
and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in
reference to their eternal salvation, and that is that every one should do
what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on
whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness. For
obedience is due, in the first place, to God and, afterwards to the laws.
But some may ask: “What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his
authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private person?” I
answer that, if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of
the magistrates be indeed directed to the public good, this will seldom
happen. But if, perhaps, it do so fall out, I say, that such a private
person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to
undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the
private judgement of any person concerning a law enacted in political
matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law,
nor deserve a dispensation. But if the law, indeed, be concerning things
that lie not within the verge of the magistrate’s authority (as, for
example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to
embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of
another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against
their consciences. For the political society is instituted for no other end,
but only to secure every man’s possession of the things of this life. The
care of each man’s soul and of the things of heaven, which neither does
belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to
every man’s self. Thus the safeguard of men’s lives and of the things that
belong unto this life is the business of the commonwealth; and the
preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate.
And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this
man or party and give them to that; nor change propriety amongst fellow
subjects (no not even by a law), for a cause that has no relation to the end
of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or
false does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow subjects,
which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.
But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for the public
good? I answer: As the private judgement of any particular person, if
erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law, so the private
judgement (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not give him any new
right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the
constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the
people to grant, much less if he make it his business to enrich and advance
his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what if
the magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws and that they
are for the public good, and his subjects believe the contrary? Who shall be
judge between them? I answer: God alone. For there is no judge upon earth
between the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say, is the only judge
in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day according to
his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in
endeavouring to promote piety, and the public weal, and peace of mankind.
But What shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and chief
care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next place,
of the public peace; though yet there are very few will think it is peace
there, where they see all laid waste.
There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the
other by force; and these are of that nature that where the one ends, the
other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of
the magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what
usually happens where controversies arise without a judge to determine them.
You will say, then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and
carry his point. Without doubt; but the question is not here concerning the
doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.
But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions contrary to human
society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of
civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these, indeed,
examples in any Church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to such a
degree of madness as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of
religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society and
are, therefore, condemned by the judgement of all mankind; because their own
interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered.
Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when
men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar
prerogative covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in
effect opposite to the civil right of the community. For example: we cannot
find any sect that teaches, expressly and openly, that men are not obliged
to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ
from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to
themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon
draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate and awaken all the care of
the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an
evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other
words. What else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with
heretics? Their meaning, forsooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith
belongs unto themselves; for they declare all that are not of their
communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they
think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting that kings
excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms? It is evident that they
thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they
challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their
hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also an assertion by which
those that maintain it do plainly lay claim to the possession of all things.
For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe, or at least as
not to profess themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These,
therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and
orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege
or power above other mortals, in civil concernments; or who upon pretence of
religion do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not
associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion, I say these have no
right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will not own
and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For
what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are
ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and possess themselves of
the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects; and that they only ask
leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so long until they find themselves
strong enough to effect it?
Again: That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which
is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do
thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of
another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the
settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own
people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government.
Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the
Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; especially when both the one
and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same
person, who has not only power to persuade the members of his Church to
whatsoever he lists, either as purely religious, or in order thereunto, but
can also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any
one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in
everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the
same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the
Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman
Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his
pleasure. But this Mahometan living amongst Christians would yet more
apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to
be head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.
Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God.
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can
have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in
thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine
and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to
challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions,
though not absolutely free from all error, if they do not tend to establish
domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church in which they are
taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated.
It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies which, being
vulgarly called and perhaps having sometimes been conventicles and nurseries
of factions and seditions, are thought to afford against this doctrine of
toleration. But this has not happened by anything peculiar unto the genius
of such assemblies, but by the unhappy circumstances of an oppressed or
ill-settled liberty. These accusations would soon cease if the law of
toleration were once so settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down
toleration as the foundation of their own liberty, and teach that liberty of
conscience is every man’s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters as
to themselves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion
either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would take away
all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience; and these
causes of discontents and animosities being once removed, there would remain
nothing in these assemblies that were not more peaceable and less apt to
produce disturbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever. But let
us examine particularly the heads of these accusations.
You will say that assemblies and meetings endanger the public peace and
threaten the commonwealth. I answer: If this be so, why are there daily such
numerous meetings in markets and Courts of Judicature? Why are crowds upon
the Exchange and a concourse of people in cities suffered? You will reply:
“Those are civil assemblies, but these we object against are
ecclesiastical.” I answer: It is a likely thing, indeed, that such
assemblies as are altogether remote from civil affairs should be most apt to
embroil them. Oh, but civil assemblies are composed of men that differ from
one another in matters of religion, but these ecclesiastical meetings are of
persons that are all of one opinion. As if an agreement in matters of
religion were in effect a conspiracy against the commonwealth; or as if men
would not be so much the more warmly unanimous in religion the less liberty
they had of assembling. But it will be urged still that civil assemblies are
open and free for any one to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are
more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations. I
answer that this is not strictly true, for many civil assemblies are not
open to everyone. And if some religious meetings be private, who are they (I
beseech you) that are to be blamed for it, those that desire, or those that
forbid their being public! Again, you will say that religious communion does
exceedingly unite men’s minds and affections to one another and is therefore
the more dangerous. But if this be so, why is not the magistrate afraid of
his own Church; and why does he not forbid their assemblies as things
dangerous to his Government? You will say because he himself is a part and
even the head of them. As if he were not also a part of the commonwealth, and
the head of the whole people!
Let us therefore deal plainly. The magistrate is afraid of other Churches,
but not of his own, because he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe
and cruel to the other. These he treats like children, and indulges them
even to wantonness. Those he uses as slaves and, how blamelessly soever they
demean themselves, recompenses them no otherwise than by galleys, prisons,
confiscations, and death. These he cherishes and defends; those he
continually scourges and oppresses. Let him turn the tables. Or let those
dissenters enjoy but the same privileges in civils as his other subjects,
and he will quickly find that these religious meetings will be no longer
dangerous. For if men enter into seditious conspiracies, it is not religion
inspires them to it in their meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions
that make them willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate governments are
everywhere quiet, everywhere safe; but oppression raises ferments and makes
men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that
seditions are very frequently raised upon pretence of religion, but it is as
true that for religion subjects are frequently ill treated and live
miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made proceed not from any peculiar
temper of this or that Church or religious society, but from the common
disposition of all mankind, who when they groan under any heavy burthen
endeavour naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppose
this business of religion were let alone, and that there were some other
distinction made between men and men upon account of their different
complexions, shapes, and features, so that those who have black hair (for
example) or grey eyes should not enjoy the same privileges as other
citizens; that they should not be permitted either to buy or sell, or live
by their callings; that parents should not have the government and education
of their own children; that all should either be excluded from the benefit
of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be doubted but these
persons, thus distinguished from others by the colour of their hair and
eyes, and united together by one common persecution, would be as dangerous
to the magistrate as any others that had associated themselves merely upon
the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and profit,
others for want of business have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins
some and religion others. But there is only one thing which gathers people
into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.
You will say “What, will you have people to meet at divine service against
the magistrate’s will?” I answer: Why, I pray, against his will? Is it not
both lawful and necessary that they should meet? Against his will, do you
say? That is what I complain of; that is the very root of all the mischief.
Why are assemblies less sufferable in a church than in a theatre or market?
Those that meet there are not either more vicious or more turbulent than
those that meet elsewhere. The business in that is that they are ill used,
and therefore they are not to be suffered. Take away the partiality that is
used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the
penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately
become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the religion of the
magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the
peace of the commonwealth as their condition is better in that place than
elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many
guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be
innovated or changed in the form of the government, because they can hope
for nothing better than what they already enjoy — that is, an equal
condition with their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government.
Now if that Church which agrees in religion with the prince be esteemed the
chief support of any civil government, and that for no other reason (as has
already been shown) than because the prince is kind and the laws are
favourable to it, how much greater will be the security of government where
all good subjects, of whatsoever Church they be, without any distinction upon
account of religion, enjoying the same favour of the prince and the same
benefit of the laws, shall become the common support and guard of it, and
where none will have any occasion to fear the severity of the laws but those
that do injuries to their neighbours and offend against the civil peace?
That we may draw towards a conclusion. The sum of all we drive at is that
every man may enjoy the same rights that are granted to others. Is it
permitted to worship God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted to do it
in the Geneva form also. Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market-place?
Let those that have a mind to it be permitted to do it also in the Church.
Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel, stand, sit, or use any
other posture; and to clothe himself in white or black, in short or in long
garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink wine, or wash with
water in the church. In a word, whatsoever things are left free by law in
the common occasions of life, let them remain free unto every Church in
divine worship. Let no man’s life, or body, or house, or estate, suffer any
manner of prejudice upon these accounts. Can you allow of the Presbyterian
discipline? Why should not the Episcopal also have what they like?
Ecclesiastical authority, whether it be administered by the hands of a
single person or many, is everywhere the same; and neither has any
jurisdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power of compulsion, nor
anything at all to do with riches and revenues.
Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by daily experience and
public allowance. These are allowed to people of some one persuasion; why
not to all? If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary
to the public peace, it is to be punished in the same manner and no
otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market. These meetings
ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and flagitious fellows. Nor ought
it to be less lawful for men to meet in churches than in halls; nor are one
part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for their meeting together
than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions, and no man
is to be laid under a suspicion or odium for the fault of another. Those
that are seditious, murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, slanderers,
etc., of whatsoever Church, whether national or not, ought to be punished
and suppressed. But those whose doctrine is peaceable and whose manners are
pure and blameless ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects.
Thus if solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public worship be
permitted to any one sort of professors, all these things ought to be
permitted to the Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians,
Quakers, and others, with the same liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak the
truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor
Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because
of his religion. The Gospel commands no such thing. The Church which
“judgeth not those that are without”[9] wants it not. And the commonwealth,
which embraces indifferently all men that are honest, peaceable, and
industrious, requires it not. Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with
us, and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow
the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not
allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false, their worship
more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered by their meeting in
public than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to
Jews and Pagans, surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be
worse than theirs in a Christian commonwealth.
You will say, perhaps: “Yes, it ought to be; because they are more
inclinable to factions, tumults, and civil wars.” I answer: Is this the
fault of the Christian religion? If it be so, truly the Christian religion
is the worst of all religions and ought neither to be embraced by any
particular person, nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the
genius, this the nature of the Christian religion, to be turbulent and
destructive to the civil peace, that Church itself which the magistrate
indulges will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to say any such
thing of that religion which carries the greatest opposition to
covetousness, ambition, discord, contention, and all manner of inordinate
desires, and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was. We
must, therefore, seek another cause of those evils that are charged upon
religion. And, if we consider right, we shall find it to consist wholly in
the subject that I am treating of. It is not the diversity of opinions
(which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are
of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all
the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of
religion. The heads and leaders of the Church, moved by avarice and
insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the immoderate ambition of
magistrates and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude, have
incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves, by
preaching unto them, contrary to the laws of the Gospel and to the precepts
of charity, that schismatics and heretics are to be outed of their
possessions and destroyed. And thus have they mixed together and confounded
two things that are in themselves most different, the Church and the
commonwealth. Now as it is very difficult for men patiently to suffer
themselves to be stripped of the goods which they have got by their honest
industry, and, contrary to all the laws of equity, both human and divine, to
be delivered up for a prey to other men’s violence and rapine; especially
when they are otherwise altogether blameless; and that the occasion for
which they are thus treated does not at all belong to the jurisdiction of
the magistrate, but entirely to the conscience of every particular man for
the conduct of which he is accountable to God only; what else can be
expected but that these men, growing weary of the evils under which they
labour, should in the end think it lawful for them to resist force with
force, and to defend their natural rights (which are not forfeitable upon
account of religion) with arms as well as they can? That this has been
hitherto the ordinary course of things is abundantly evident in history, and
that it will continue to be so hereafter is but too apparent in reason. It
cannot indeed, be otherwise so long as the principle of persecution for
religion shall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with magistrate and people,
and so long as those that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord
shall continue with all their art and strength to excite men to arms and
sound the trumpet of war. But that magistrates should thus suffer these
incendiaries and disturbers of the public peace might justly be wondered at
if it did not appear that they have been invited by them unto a
participation of the spoil, and have therefore thought fit to make use of
their covetousness and pride as means whereby to increase their own power.
For who does not see that these good men are, indeed, more ministers of the
government than ministers of the Gospel and that, by flattering the ambition
and favouring the dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour
with all their might to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth which
otherwise they should not be able to establish in the Church? This is the
unhappy agreement that we see between the Church and State. Whereas if each
of them would contain itself within its own bounds — the one attending to
the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls
– it is impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them.
Sed pudet hoec opprobria. etc. God Almighty grant, I beseech Him, that the
gospel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magistrates,
growing more careful to conform their own consciences to the law of God and
less solicitous about the binding of other men’s consciences by human laws,
may, like fathers of their country, direct all their counsels and endeavours
to promote universally the civil welfare of all their children, except only
of such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their brethren; and
that all ecclesiastical men, who boast themselves to be the successors of the
Apostles, walking peaceably and modestly in the Apostles’ steps, without
intermeddling with State Affairs, may apply themselves wholly to promote the
salvation of souls.
FAREWELL.
PERHAPS it may not be amiss to add a few things concerning heresy and
schism. A Turk is not, nor can be, either heretic or schismatic to a
Christian; and if any man fall off from the Christian faith to Mahometism,
he does not thereby become a heretic or schismatic, but an apostate and an
infidel. This nobody doubts of; and by this it appears that men of different
religions cannot be heretics or schismatics to one another.
We are to inquire, therefore, what men are of the same religion. Concerning
which it is manifest that those who have one and the same rule of faith and
worship are of the same religion; and those who have not the same rule of
faith and worship are of different religions. For since all things that
belong unto that religion are contained in that rule, it follows necessarily
that those who agree in one rule are of one and the same religion, and vice
versa. Thus Turks and Christians are of different religions, because these
take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion, and those the
Alcoran. And for the same reason there may be different religions also even
amongst Christians. The Papists and Lutherans, though both of them profess
faith in Christ and are therefore called Christians, yet are not both of the
same religion, because these acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to
be the rule and foundation of their religion, those take in also traditions
and the decrees of Popes and of these together make the rule of their
religion; and thus the Christians of St. John (as they are called) and the
Christians of Geneva are of different religions, because these also take
only the Scriptures, and those I know not what traditions, for the rule of
their religion.
This being settled, it follows, first, that heresy is a separation made in
ecclesiastical communion between men of the same religion for some opinions
no way contained in the rule itself; and, secondly, that amongst those who
acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith,
heresy is a separation made in their Christian communion for opinions not
contained in the express words of Scripture. Now this separation may be made
in a twofold manner:
1. When the greater part, or by the magistrate’s patronage the stronger
part, of the Church separates itself from others by excluding them out of
her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions
which are not the express words of the Scripture. For it is not the paucity
of those that are separated, nor the authority of the magistrate, that can
make any man guilty of heresy, but he only is a heretic who divides the
Church into parts, introduces names and marks of distinction, and
voluntarily makes a separation because of such opinions.
2. When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because
that Church does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy
Scriptures do not expressly teach.
Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals, and they err
obstinately against knowledge; for when they have determined the Holy
Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they nevertheless lay down
certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture, and
because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs, nor
build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental, they therefore
make a separation in the Church, either by withdrawing themselves from
others, or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for
them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture
and to the analogy of faith; for if they be conceived in the express words
of Scripture, there can be no question about them, because those things are
acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore
fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they require to be
professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture, it is undoubtedly
well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so
agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude
those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable
doctrines of the Scripture; and to make a separation for such things as
these, which neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become heretics; for
I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he
dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as divine
inspirations and compare the articles of faith that he has framed according
to his own fancy with the authority of Scripture. I know there are some
propositions so evidently agreeable to Scripture that nobody can deny them
to be drawn from thence, but about those, therefore, there can be no
difference. This only I say — that however clearly we may think this or the
other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to
impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it
to be agreeable to the rule of faith, unless we would be content also that
other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner, and that we
should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and
contradictory opinions of Lutherans, Calvinists, Remonstrants, Anabaptists,
and other sects which the contrivers of symbols, systems, and confessions
are accustomed to deliver to their followers as genuine and necessary
deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant
arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things
necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and
infinite wisdom of God.
Thus much concerning heresy, which word in common use is applied only to the
doctrinal part of religion. Let us now consider schism, which is a crime
near akin to it; for both these words seem unto me to signify an
ill-grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not
necessary. But since use, which is the supreme law in matter of language,
has determined that heresy relates to errors in faith, and schism to those
in worship or discipline, we must consider them under that distinction.
Schism, then, for the same reasons that have already been alleged, is
nothing else but a separation made in the communion of the Church upon
account of something in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is
not any necessary part of it. Now, nothing in worship or discipline can be
necessary to Christian communion but what Christ our legislator, or the
Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in express words.
In a word, he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in
express words, nor makes a separation upon occasion of anything that is not
manifestly contained in the sacred text — however he may be nicknamed by
any sect of Christians and declared by some or all of them to be utterly
void of true Christianity — yet in deed and in truth this man cannot be
either a heretic or schismatic.
These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously,
but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your
parts.
Notes:
1. Luke 22. 25.
2. II Tim. 2. 19.
3. Luke 22. 32.
4. Rom. I.
5. Gal. 5.
6. Matt. 18. 20.
7. Exod. 22, 20, 21.
8. Deut. 2.
9. I Cor. 5. 12, 13.
