I even have an opinion… but I’m actually not writing to push my personal opinion, though I’ll happily tell you what it is, but rather I’m writing today to comment on what this debate really says about US, the people of these ‘United States’  and what the heck is wrong with us.

So, I’ll start by coming out with it and giving my take on it. Long story, short… a Right is quite different from being right. I believe that you ought to have the Right to do just about anything you like so long as you don’t take my blood or pick my pocket (to put it briefly). At the same time, I don’t think it’s right for anyone to do half the things they do, especially the things they do in places like San Francisco.

I think that the Klan as a Right to hate anyone they choose, but I don’t think it would be right for them to build a KKK Cultural Center across the street from MLK’s grave.

That’s my opinion.

But, what I find interesting isn’t so much which side of the debate everyone comes down on, as much as what the debate itself says about America and the state that we’re in. I’m actually surprised at how divisive this debate seems to be. Generally speaking, I’m all for raucous debate. I’m not one of these people that get offended by passionate people passionately debating their points of view. I welcome it. I don’t mind name calling. I don’t mind calling an idiot an idiot. I don’t mind calling a racist a racist. I don’t mind calling a socialist a socialist… that is sometimes just part of it and it’s been part of it since this country was founded. You want to see some vicious arguments… read American history. Read the founders. Read John Hamilton. Read Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. Read what some even said about George Washington towards the end of his tenure as President of the United States.

Hell, I’m more offended by this totally non-offensive political correctness that seems to have been inserted into our discourse. Oh my… heaven forbid we offend a Muslim by saying that Islam is the enemy of liberty.

Let me say flatly… Islam is the enemy of Liberty…. Period.

Now, that said, does it mean that all Muslims are evil? No. I don’t believe that all Nazis were evil. I don’t believe that all communists were evil. I do believe that Nazism, Communism, and Islam… as ideologies and forms of government, are indeed evil. I believe that each, in their own ways are the enemy of liberty.

Now, I’m generally a pretty big fan of organizations like the Cato Institute. If you don’t know, Cato is a libertarian think tank. It’s not a partisan organization. Like me, they’re against the Democrats as much as they’re against Republicans.

Now, it seems that their take is that, as a Libertarian group, the entire mosque issue is a red-herring. Which, on one level it may be. I guarantee that there will be plenty of politicians that make the mosque the issue diseur. They will make it the biggest issue facing the future or the nation… it’s not.

So, to be clear, I don’t think that a mosque near ground zero is going to have anything to do with me living out here in Western Oklahoma, USA.

The debate that has erupted from it will.

You see, on one side you have a group of people (and I’ll give them credit, most are probably heart felt, kind, considerate people… most mind you) that call for tolerance and inclusiveness. Many of those people feel that to argue against the mosque is tantamount to arguing against the principles of freedom of religion that is at the core of the American ideal. I get it.

I see their point.

They’re wrong, but I see their point.

From John Locke’s ‘Letter Concerning Toleration’:

I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects; and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

 Again: That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; especially when both the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only power to persuade the members of his Church to whatsoever he lists, either as purely religious, or in order thereunto, but can also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure. But this Mahometan living amongst Christians would yet more apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to be head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.

So, 400 years ago, one of the men who birthed the idea of religious freedom that found its way into our First Amendment…

… made a specific exception for Islam.

To make a long story short, Locke argued that we must be careful about being tolerant towards those who would use our toleration as a means to subvert us, which history will tell us that that is what Islam does as a matter of practice.

It’s not unlike Saul Alinsky’s “Rules for Radicals”. One of his tactics was to use our own tolerance against us. Use our freedom of speech to allow speech that would preach tyranny.

So, while I don’t think that the mosque will harm America… the idea that we must be tolerant of Islam for the sake of toleration is. We can afford to be intolerant of ideologies that preach hatred. We can afford to be intolerant of ideologies that preach the subjugation of women. We can be intolerant of ideologies that, well produce states like Saudi Arabia and Iran that don’t give a flyin’ flip about civil rights, human rights or any rights.

1689

Translated by William Popple

Honoured Sir,

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual

toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must

needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief

characteristic mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast of

the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship;

others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of

their faith — for everyone is orthodox to himself — these things, and all

others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and

empire over one another than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never

so true a claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of charity,

meekness, and good-will in general towards all mankind, even to those that

are not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian

himself. “The kings of the Gentiles exercise leadership over them,” said our

Saviour to his disciples, “but ye shall not be so.”[1] The business of true

religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted in order to the

erecting of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical

dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to the regulating

of men’s lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will

list himself under the banner of Christ, must, in the first place and above

all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is in vain for any man

to unsurp the name of Christian, without holiness of life, purity of

manners, benignity and meekness of spirit. “Let everyone that nameth the

name of Christ, depart from iniquity.”[2] “Thou, when thou art converted,

strengthen thy brethren,” said our Lord to Peter.[3] It would, indeed, be

very hard for one that appears careless about his own salvation to persuade

me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that

those should sincerely and heartily apply themselves to make other people

Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian religion in their own

hearts. If the Gospel and the apostles may be credited, no man can be a

Christian without charity and without that faith which works, not by force,

but by love. Now, I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute,

torment, destroy, and kill other men upon pretence of religion, whether they

do it out of friendship and kindness towards them or no? And I shall then

indeed, and not until then, believe they do so, when I shall see those fiery

zealots correcting, in the same manner, their friends and familiar

acquaintance for the manifest sins they commit against the precepts of the

Gospel; when I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of

their own communion that are tainted with enormous vices and without

amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see them thus

express their love and desire of the salvation of their souls by the

infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be

out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men’s souls that

they deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments,

starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take away

their lives — I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians and

procure their salvation, why then do they suffer whoredom, fraud, malice,

and such-like enormities, which (according to the apostle)[4] manifestly

relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and abound amongst

their flocks and people? These, and such-like things, are certainly more

contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the Church, and to the

salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical

decisions, or separation from public worship, whilst accompanied with

innocence of life. Why, then, does this burning zeal for God, for the

Church, and for the salvation of souls — burning I say, literally, with

fire and faggot — pass by those moral vices and wickednesses, without any

chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically opposite

to the profession of Christianity, and bend all its nerves either to the

introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of opinions, which for

the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity

of ordinary understandings? Which of the parties contending about these

things is in the right, which of them is guilty of schism or heresy, whether

those that domineer or those that suffer, will then at last be manifest when

the causes of their separation comes to be judged of He, certainly, that

follows Christ, embraces His doctrine, and bears His yoke, though he forsake

both father and mother, separate from the public assemblies and ceremonies

of his country, or whomsoever or whatsoever else he relinquishes, will not

then be judged a heretic.

Now, though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be

never so obstructive of the salvation of souls; yet, nevertheless, adultery,

fornication, uncleanliness, lasciviousness, idolatry, and such-like things,

cannot be denied to be works of the flesh, concerning which the apostle has

expressly declared that “they who do them shall not inherit the kingdom of

God.”[5] Whosoever, therefore, is sincerely solicitous about the kingdom of

God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men,

ought to apply himself with no less care and industry to the rooting out of

these immoralities than to the extirpation of sects. But if anyone do

otherwise, and whilst he is cruel and implacable towards those that differ

from him in opinion, he be indulgent to such iniquities and immoralities as

are unbecoming the name of a Christian, let such a one talk never so much of

the Church, he plainly demonstrates by his actions that it is another

kingdom he aims at and not the advancement of the kingdom of God.

That any man should think fit to cause another man — whose salvation he

heartily desires — to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted

state, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any other

also. But nobody, surely, will ever believe that such a carriage can proceed

from charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain that men ought to be

compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to

this or that exterior worship, without any regard had unto their morals; if

anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith, by

forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to

practise things that the Gospel does not permit, it cannot be doubted indeed

but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same

profession with himself; but that he principally intends by those means to

compose a truly Christian Church is altogether incredible. It is not,

therefore, to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the

advancement of the true religion, and of the Church of Christ, make use of

arms that do not belong to the Christian warfare. If, like the Captain of

our salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls, they would tread in

the steps and follow the perfect example of that Prince of Peace, who sent

out His soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them into His

Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force, but

prepared with the Gospel of peace and with the exemplary holiness of their

conversation. This was His method. Though if infidels were to be converted

by force, if those that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off

from their errors by armed soldiers, we know very well that it was much more

easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of

the Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.

The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so

agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of

mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive

the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not here tax

the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of others.

These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be

perfectly freed; but yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of,

without covering them with some specious colour; and so pretend to

commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions.

But, however, that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and

unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public weal and

observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may

not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a word, that

none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty

and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship

of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the

business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just

bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there

can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between

those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment

for the interest of men’s souls, and, on the other side, a care of the

commonwealth.

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the

procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.

Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and

the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture,

and the like.

It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal

laws, to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his

subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this

life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity,

established for the preservation of those things, his presumption is to be

checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation or

diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and

ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be

punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his

liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and

strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that

violate any other man’s rights.

Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these

civil concernments, and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded

and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither

can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls, these

following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.

First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate,

any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God;

because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man

over another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such power be

vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people, because no man can so

far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice

of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or

worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to

the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in

the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without

believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we

conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true

and the other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far

from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For

in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion,

I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be

displeasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of

hypocrisy and contempt of His Divine Majesty.

In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil

magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true and

saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which

nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the

understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by

outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of

that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward

judgement that they have framed of things.

It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and,

thereby; draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their

salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In

teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he may

certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy does not oblige him

to put off either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing to persuade,

another to command; one thing to press with arguments, another with

penalties. This civil power alone has a right to do; to the other, goodwill

is authority enough. Every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince

another of error, and, by reasoning, to draw him into truth; but to give

laws, receive obedience, and compel with the sword, belongs to none but the

magistrate. And, upon this ground, I affirm that the magistrate’s power

extends not to the establishing of any articles of faith, or forms of

worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without

penalties, and penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because

they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the profession of any

articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship (as has

been already said), can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the

truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other unto God be thoroughly

believed by those that so profess and practise. But penalties are no way

capable to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence that can work

a change in men’s opinions; which light can in no manner proceed from

corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties.

In the third place, the care of the salvation of men’s souls cannot belong

to the magistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of

penalties were capable to convince and change men’s minds, yet would not

that help at all to the salvation of their souls. For there being but one

truth, one way to heaven, what hope is there that more men would be led into

it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under the

necessity to quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of

their own consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to the will of

their governors and to the religion which either ignorance, ambition, or

superstition had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born?

In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the

princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests, the

narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone would be in the

right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following

their princes in the ways that lead to destruction; and that which heightens

the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would owe their

eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity.

These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the

same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude that all the power of

civil government relates only to men’s civil interests, is confined to the

care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to

come.

Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a

voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in

order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge

acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.

I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any

church; otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by the

same right of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone would hold

his faith by the same tenure he does his lands, than which nothing can be

imagined more absurd. Thus, therefore, that matter stands. No man by nature

is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself

voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that

profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hope of

salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion, so

it can be the only reason of his stay there. For if afterwards he discover

anything either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the worship of

that society to which he has joined himself, why should it not be as free for

him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a religious society can be

tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of

eternal life. A church, then, is a society of members voluntarily uniting to

that end.

It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto

what laws it is subject.

Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion

instituted, whether of philosophers for learning, of merchants for commerce,

or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and discourse, no church or

company, I say, can in the least subsist and hold together, but will

presently dissolve and break in pieces, unless it be regulated by some laws,

and the members all consent to observe some order. Place and time of meeting

must be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding members must be

established; distinction of officers, and putting things into a regular

course, and suchlike, cannot be omitted. But since the joining together of

several members into this church-society, as has already been demonstrated,

is absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of

making its laws can belong to none but the society itself; or, at least

(which is the same thing), to those whom the society by common consent has

authorised thereunto.

Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be said to be a true

church unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter, with ruling authority

derived from the very apostles, and continued down to the present times by

an uninterrupted succession.

To these I answer: In the first place, let them show me the edict by which

Christ has imposed that law upon His Church. And let not any man think me

impertinent, if in a thing of this consequence I require that the terms of

that edict be very express and positive; for the promise He has made us,[6]

that “wheresoever two or three are gathered together” in His name, He will

be in the midst of them, seems to imply the contrary. Whether such an

assembly want anything necessary to a true church, pray do you consider.

Certain I am that nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of souls,

which is sufficient to our purpose.

Next, pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst even

those who lay so much stress upon the Divine institution and continued

succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now, their very

dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating and,

consequently, allows a liberty of choosing that which upon consideration we

prefer.

And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler in their

church, established by such a long series of succession as they judge

necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to

that society in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are

necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty

will be preserved on all sides, and no man will have a legislator imposed

upon him but whom himself has chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them

here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ to

make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such things

only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express

words, to be necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be not more

agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their own

inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine

authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary

to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do

either not mention, or at least not expressly command? Whosoever requires

those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not

require in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed constitute a

society accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage; but how that

can be called the Church of Christ which is established upon laws that are

not His, and which excludes such persons from its communion as He will one

day receive into the Kingdom of Heaven, I understand not. But this being not

a proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church, I will only

mind those that contend so earnestly for the decrees of their own society,

and that cry out continually, “The Church! the Church!” with as much noise,

and perhaps upon the same principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for

their Diana; this, I say, I desire to mind them of, that the Gospel

frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer

persecution; but that the Church of Christ should persecute others, and

force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could

never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public

worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All

discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical

laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this

society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is

here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs

wholly to the civil magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is

subject to his jurisdiction.

But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be

established, if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I

answer: They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such

things, whereof the external profession and observation — if not proceeding

from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind — is altogether

useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are

to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If

by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous

convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn

and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation,

should be cast out and separated from the society. This is the last and

utmost force of ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can thereby be

inflicted than that, the relation ceasing between the body and the member

which is cut off. The person so condemned ceases to be a part of that

church.

These things being thus determined, let us inquire, in the next place: How

far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by

it?

And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to

retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues

obstinately to offend against the laws of the society. For, these being the

condition of communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them

were permitted without any animadversion the society would immediately be

thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such cases care is to be taken

that the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with

it no rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person may any wise

be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often been said)

belongs only to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons at any time to

use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust violence.

Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of

any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All those things belong

to the civil government and are under the magistrate’s protection. The whole

force of excommunication consists only in this: that, the resolution of the

society in that respect being declared, the union that was between the body

and some member comes thereby to be dissolved; and, that relation ceasing,

the participation of some certain things which the society communicated to

its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes also to cease.

For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the

church minister’s refusing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of

the Lord’s Supper, which was not bought with his but other men’s money.

Secondly, no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another

person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion.

All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a denizen,

are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of

religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be

Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow

measures of bare justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to

it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that natural

fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right

way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to

punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be

miserable in that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing

from one another in religion, I understand also of particular churches which

stand, as it were, in the same relation to each other as private persons

among themselves: nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over

any other; no, not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens)

comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can

give no new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So

that, whether the magistrate join himself to any church, or separate from

it, the church remains always as it was before — a free and voluntary

society. It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate’s

coming to it, nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication

by his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a

spontaneous society — that it has power to remove any of its members who

transgress the rules of its institution; but it cannot, by the accession of

any new members, acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not

joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendship are always

mutually to be observed by particular churches, in the same manner as by

private persons, without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over

one another.

That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let us suppose two

churches — the one of Arminians, the other of Calvinists — residing in the

city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has

right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as

we see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some

doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks, in the meanwhile, silently stand

by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against

Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the

other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what

right? It will be answered, undoubtedly, that it is the orthodox church

which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is,

in great and specious words, to say just nothing at all. For every church is

orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any

church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things

it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy between these churches

about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on

both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or

elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined. The decision

of that question belongs only to the Supreme judge of all men, to whom also

alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous. In the meanwhile, let those

men consider how heinously they sin, who, adding injustice, if not to their

error, yet certainly to their pride, do rashly and arrogantly take upon them

to misuse the servants of another master, who are not at all accountable to

them.

Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches

were in the right, there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any

right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction in

worldly matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to

convince men’s minds of error, and inform them of the truth. Let us suppose,

nevertheless, that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and

to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise

the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say that any right can be

derived unto a Christian church over its brethren from a Turkish emperor? An

infidel, who has himself no authority to punish Christians for the articles

of their faith, cannot confer such an authority upon any society of

Christians, nor give unto them a right which he has not himself. This would

be the case at Constantinople; and the reason of the thing is the same in

any Christian kingdom. The civil power is the same in every place. Nor can

that power, in the hands of a Christian prince, confer any greater authority

upon the Church than in the hands of a heathen; which is to say, just none

at all.

Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed and lamented that the most violent

of these defenders of the truth, the opposers of errors, the exclaimers

against schism do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God, with which

they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the civil magistrate

on their side. But so soon as ever court favour has given them the better

end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves the stronger, then

presently peace and charity are to be laid aside. Otherwise they are

religiously to be observed. Where they have not the power to carry on

persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live upon fair terms

and preach up toleration. When they are not strengthened with the civil

power, then they can bear most patiently and unmovedly the contagion of

idolatry, superstition, and heresy in their neighbourhood; of which on other

occasions the interest of religion makes them to be extremely apprehensive.

They do not forwardly attack those errors which are in fashion at court or

are countenanced by the government. Here they can be content to spare their

arguments; which yet (with their leave) is the only right method of

propagating truth, which has no such way of prevailing as when strong

arguments and good reason are joined with the softness of civility and good

usage.

Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor

even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and

worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are of

another opinion would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious a

seed of discord and war, how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds,

rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and

security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or

preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is

founded in grace and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.

In the third place, let us see what the duty of toleration requires from

those who are distinguished from the rest of mankind (from the laity, as

they please to call us) by some ecclesiastical character and office; whether

they be bishops, priests, presbyters, ministers, or however else dignified

or distinguished. It is not my business to inquire here into the original of

the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that, whencesoever

their authority be sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it ought to be

confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner be

extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing absolutely

separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides

are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things

most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their

original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely

different from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical

office he be dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church

and faith either of liberty or of any part of his worldly goods upon the

account of that difference between them in religion. For whatsoever is not

lawful to the whole Church cannot by any ecclesiastical right become lawful

to any of its members.

But this is not all. It is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from

violence and rapine and all manner of persecution. He that pretends to be a

successor of the apostles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is

obliged also to admonish his hearers of the duties of peace and goodwill

towards all men, as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards

those that differ from them in faith and worship as well as towards those

that agree with them therein. And he ought industriously to exhort all men,

whether private persons or magistrates (if any such there be in his church),

to charity, meekness, and toleration, and diligently endeavour to ally and

temper all that heat and unreasonable averseness of mind which either any

man’s fiery zeal for his own sect or the craft of others has kindled against

dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how happy and how great would

be the fruit, both in Church and State, if the pulpits everywhere sounded

with this doctrine of peace and toleration, lest I should seem to reflect

too severely upon those men whose dignity I desire not to detract from, nor

would have it diminished either by others or themselves. But this I say,

that thus it ought to be. And if anyone that professes himself to be a

minister of the Word of God, a preacher of the gospel of peace, teach

otherwise, he either understands not or neglects the business of his calling

and shall one day give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace. If

Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all manner of

revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries, how much

more ought they who suffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, forbear

violence and abstain from all manner of ill-usage towards those from whom

they have received none! This caution and temper they ought certainly to use

towards those. who mind only their own business and are solicitous for

nothing but that (whatever men think of them) they may worship God in that

manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have

the strongest hopes of eternal salvation. In private domestic affairs, in

the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man

may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes

best. No man complains of the ill-management of his neighbour’s affairs. No

man is angry with another for an error committed in sowing his land or in

marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his

substance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or build, or make whatsoever

expenses he pleases, nobody murmurs, nobody controls him; he has his

liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not there

conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies, or if he brings

not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the

other congregation, this immediately causes an uproar. The neighbourhood is

filled with noise and clamour. Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so

great a crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from

violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and the poor man be,

according to form, condemned to the loss of liberty, goods, or life. Oh,

that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would apply themselves with

all the strength of arguments that they are able to the confounding of men’s

errors! But let them spare their persons. Let them not supply their want of

reasons with the instruments of force, which belong to another jurisdiction

and do ill become a Churchman’s hands. Let them not call in the magistrate’s

authority to the aid of their eloquence or learning, lest perhaps, whilst

they pretend only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing

nothing but fire and sword, betray their ambition and show that what they

desire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to persuade men

of sense that he who with dry eyes and satisfaction of mind can deliver his

brother to the executioner to be burnt alive, does sincerely and heartily

concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to

come.

In the last place, let us now consider what is the magistrate’s duty in the

business of toleration, which certainly is very considerable.

We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the

magistrate. Not a magisterial care, I mean (if I may so call it), which

consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a

charitable care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading,

cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore, of every man’s soul

belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect

the care of his soul? I answer: What if he neglect the care of his health or

of his estate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the

magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law

that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as is

possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud

and violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence or

ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be rich

or healthful whether he will or no. Nay, God Himself will not save men

against their wills. Let us suppose, however, that some prince were desirous

to force his subjects to accumulate riches, or to preserve the health and

strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law that they must consult

none but Roman physicians, and shall everyone be bound to live according to

their prescriptions? What, shall no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is

prepared either in the Vatican, suppose, or in a Geneva shop? Or, to make

these subjects rich, shall they all be obliged by law to become merchants or

musicians? Or, shall everyone turn victualler, or smith, because there are

some that maintain their families plentifully and grow rich in those

professions? But, it may be said, there are a thousand ways to wealth, but

one only way to heaven. It is well said, indeed, especially by those that

plead for compelling men into this or the other way. For if there were

several ways that led thither, there would not be so much as a pretence left

for compulsion. But now, if I be marching on with my utmost vigour in that

way which, according to the sacred geography, leads straight to Jerusalem,

why am I beaten and ill-used by others because, perhaps, I wear not buskins;

because my hair is not of the right cut; because, perhaps, I have not been

dipped in the right fashion; because I eat flesh upon the road, or some

other food which agrees with my stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways,

which seem unto me to lead into briars or precipices; because, amongst the

several paths that are in the same road, I choose that to walk in which

seems to be the straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep company

with some travellers that are less grave and others that are more sour than

they ought to be; or, in fine, because I follow a guide that either is, or

is not, clothed in white, or crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we consider

right, we shall find that, for the most part, they are such frivolous things

as these that (without any prejudice to religion or the salvation of souls,

if not accompanied with superstition or hypocrisy) might either be observed

or omitted. I say they are such-like things as these which breed implacable

enmities amongst Christian brethren, who are all agreed in the substantial

and truly fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all things that are not of

their mode, that from these circumstances are different ends. What shall we

conclude from thence? There is only one of these which is the true way to

eternal happiness: but in this great variety of ways that men follow, it is

still doubted which is the right one. Now, neither the care of the

commonwealth, nor the right enacting of laws, does discover this way that

leads to heaven more certainly to the magistrate than every private man’s

search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a weak body, sunk under a

languishing disease, for which (I suppose) there is one only remedy, but

that unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magistrate to prescribe me a

remedy, because there is but one, and because it is unknown? Because there is

but one way for me to escape death, will it therefore be safe for me to do

whatsoever the magistrate ordains? Those things that every man ought

sincerely to inquire into himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his

own endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon as the

peculiar possession of any sort of men. Princes, indeed, are born superior

unto other men in power, but in nature equal. Neither the right nor the art

of ruling does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of

other things, and least of all of true religion. For if it were so, how

could it come to pass that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as

they do in religious matters? But let us grant that it is probable the way

to eternal life may be better known by a prince than by his subjects, or at

least that in this incertitude of things the safest and most commodious way

for private persons is to follow his dictates. You will say: “What then?” If

he should bid you follow merchandise for your livelihood, would you decline

that course for fear it should not succeed? I answer: I would turn merchant

upon the prince’s command, because, in case I should have ill-success in

trade, he is abundantly able to make up my loss some other way. If it be

true, as he pretends, that he desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can

set me up again when unsuccessful voyages have broken me. But this is not

the case in the things that regard the life to come; if there I take a wrong

course, if in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the magistrate’s

power to repair my loss, to ease my suffering, nor to restore me in any

measure, much less entirely, to a good estate. What security can be given

for the Kingdom of Heaven?

Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this infallible judgement,

that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the

civil magistrate, but in the Church. What the Church has determined, that

the civil magistrate orders to be observed; and he provides by his authority

that nobody shall either act or believe in the business of religion

otherwise than the Church teaches. So that the judgement of those things is

in the Church; the magistrate himself yields obedience thereunto and

requires the like obedience from others. I answer: Who sees not how

frequently the name of the Church, which was venerable in time of the

apostles, has been made use of to throw dust in the people’s eyes in the

following ages? But, however, in the present case it helps us not. The one

only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate

than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide,

who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is

less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many kings of

the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus blindly

following, had not fallen into idolatry and thereby into destruction? Yet,

nevertheless, you bid me be of good courage and tell me that all is now safe

and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his

own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the Church. Of

what Church, I beseech you? of that, certainly, which likes him best. As if

he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or the other

Church, did not interpose his own judgement in the matter. What difference

is there whether he lead me himself, or deliver me over to be led by others?

I depend both ways upon his will, and it is he that determines both ways of

my eternal state. Would an Israelite that had worshipped Baal upon the

command of his king have been in any better condition because somebody had

told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor

commanded anything to be done by his subjects in divine worship but what was

approved by the counsel of priests, and declared to be of divine right by

the doctors of their Church? If the religion of any Church become,

therefore, true and saving, because the head of that sect, the prelates and

priests, and those of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might,

extol and praise it, what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false,

and destructive? I am doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I

am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the Papists, or Lutherans;

will it be ever a jot safer for me to join either unto the one or the other

of those Churches, upon the magistrate’s command, because he commands

nothing in religion but by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that

Church?

But, to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the Church (if a

convention of clergymen, making canons, must be called by that name) is for

the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by the

Church. How the Church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and Arian

emperors is very well known. Or if those things be too remote, our modern

English history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of Henry VIII,

Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy changed

their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worship, everything

according to the inclination of those kings and queens. Yet were those kings

and queens of such different minds in point of religion, and enjoined

thereupon such different things, that no man in his wits (I had almost said

none but an atheist) will presume to say that any sincere and upright

worshipper of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their several decrees.

To conclude, it is the same thing whether a king that prescribes laws to

another man’s religion pretend to do it by his own judgement, or by the

ecclesiastical authority and advice of others. The decisions of churchmen,

whose differences and disputes are sufficiently known, cannot be any sounder

or safer than his; nor can all their suffrages joined together add a new

strength to the civil power. Though this also must be taken notice of –

that princes seldom have any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that

are not favourers of their own faith and way of worship.

But, after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely determines

this controversy, is this: Although the magistrate’s opinion in religion be

sound, and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet, if I be not

thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me

in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates

of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may

grow rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some

disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot be saved by a

religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an

unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man’s profession. Faith

only and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God.

The most likely and most approved remedy can have no effect upon the

patient, if his stomach reject it as soon as taken; and you will in vain

cram a medicine down a sick man’s throat, which his particular constitution

will be sure to turn into poison. In a word, whatsoever may be doubtful in

religion, yet this at least is certain, that no religion which I believe not

to be true can be either true or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do

princes compel their subjects to come into their Church communion, under

pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of their own

accord, if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great

soever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and charity, and concern

for the salvation of men’s souls, men cannot be forced to be saved whether

they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their

own consciences.

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in

matters of religion, let us now consider what they are to do. All men know

and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped; why otherwise do

they compel one another unto the public assemblies? Men, therefore,

constituted in this liberty are to enter into some religious society, that

they meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world

that they worship God and offer unto His Divine Majesty such service as they

themselves are not ashamed of and such as they think not unworthy of Him,

nor unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by the purity of doctrine,

holiness of life, and decent form of worship, they may draw others unto the

love of the true religion, and perform such other things in religion as

cannot be done by each private man apart.

These religious societies I call Churches; and these, I say, the magistrate

ought to tolerate, for the business of these assemblies of the people is

nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of — I

mean the salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any difference

between the National Church and other separated congregations.

But as in every Church there are two things especially to be considered –

the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of

things must be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of

toleration may the more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the magistrate

has no power to enforce by law, either in his own Church, or much less in

another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of

God. And this, not only because these Churches are free societies, but

because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is only so far

justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable

unto Him. Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith is neither

well in itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose such things,

therefore, upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to

command them to offend God, which, considering that the end of all religion

is to please Him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end,

appears to be absurd beyond expression.

But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny unto the magistrate

all manner of power about indifferent things, which, if it be not granted,

the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away. No, I readily grant

that indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are subjected to the

legislative power. But it does not therefore follow that the magistrate may

ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The

public good is the rule and measure of all law-making. If a thing be not

useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not

presently be established by law.

And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are

brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out of the reach of

the magistrate’s jurisdiction, because in that use they have no connection

at all with civil affairs. The only business of the Church is the salvation

of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that

this or the other ceremony be there made use of. Neither the use nor the

omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either

advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man. For example,

let it be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an

indifferent thing, let it be granted also that the magistrate understand

such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease the

children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken

care of by a law. In that case he may order it to be done. But will any one

therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to ordain by law that all

children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the

purification of their souls? The extreme difference of these two cases is

visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the

child of a Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a

Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge

that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him, against his

own opinion, to practise in his religion a thing that is in its nature

indifferent, how can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a

Christian?

Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human

authority, be made any part of the worship of God — for this very reason:

because they are indifferent. For, since indifferent things are not capable,

by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the Deity, no human power or

authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable

them to do it. In the common affairs of life that use of indifferent things

which God has not forbidden is free and lawful, and therefore in those

things human authority has place. But it is not so in matters of religion.

Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as

they are instituted by God Himself and as He, by some positive command, has

ordained them to be made a part of that worship which He will vouchsafe to

accept at the hands of poor sinful men. Nor, when an incensed Deity shall

ask us, “Who has required these, or such-like things at your hands?” will it

be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them. If civil

jurisdiction extend thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into

religion? What hodgepodge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions,

built upon the magistrate’s authority, might not (against conscience) be

imposed upon the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these

ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as

are in their own nature indifferent; nor are they sinful upon any other

account than because God is not the author of them. The sprinkling of water

and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the

ordinary occasions of life altogether indifferent. Will any man, therefore,

say that these things could have been introduced into religion and made a

part of divine worship if not by divine institution? If any human authority

or civil power could have done this, why might it not also enjoin the eating

of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship?

Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches, and expiations by

water or fire, and abundance more of this kind? But these things, how

indifferent soever they be in common uses, when they come to be annexed unto

divine worship, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God as

the sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so abominable? What difference is

there between a dog and a goat, in respect of the divine nature, equally and

infinitely distant from all affinity with matter, unless it be that God

required the use of one in His worship and not of the other? We see,

therefore, that indifferent things, how much soever they be under the power

of the civil magistrate, yet cannot, upon that pretence, be introduced into

religion and imposed upon religious assemblies, because, in the worship of

God, they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God does it with

design to please Him and procure His favour. But that cannot be done by him

who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that which he knows will

be displeasing to Him, because not commanded by Himself. This is not to

please God, or appease his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him

by a manifest contempt, which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature

and end of worship.

But it will be here asked: “If nothing belonging to divine worship be left

to human discretion, how is it then that Churches themselves have the power

of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like?” To

this I answer that in religious worship we must distinguish between what is

part of the worship itself and what is but a circumstance. That is a part of

the worship which is believed to be appointed by God and to be well-pleasing

to Him, and therefore that is necessary. Circumstances are such things

which, though in general they cannot be separated from worship, yet the

particular instances or modifications of them are not determined, and

therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort are the time and place of

worship, habit and posture of him that worships. These are circumstances,

and perfectly indifferent, where God has not given any express command about

them. For example: amongst the Jews the time and place of their worship and

the habits of those that officiated in it were not mere circumstances, but a

part of the worship itself, in which, if anything were defective, or

different from the institution, they could not hope that it would be

accepted by God. But these, to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel,

are mere circumstances of worship, which the prudence of every Church may

bring into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order,

decency, and edification. But, even under the Gospel, those who believe the

first or the seventh day to be set apart by God, and consecrated still to

His worship, to them that portion of time is not a simple circumstance, but

a real part of Divine worship, which can neither be changed nor neglected.

In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the

use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church, so neither has he any power

to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received,

approved, and practised by any Church; because, if he did so, he would

destroy the Church itself: the end of whose institution is only to worship

God with freedom after its own manner.

You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to

sacrifice infants, or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused)

lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practise any

other such heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them,

because they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer: No. These

things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private

house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God, or in any

religious meeting. But, indeed, if any people congregated upon account of

religion should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to

be prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill his

calf at home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is

thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man’s goods. And for the

same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the

doing so be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that do

it. The part of the magistrate is only to take care that the commonwealth

receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in

life or estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a

sacrifice. But if peradventure such were the state of things that the

interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be

forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle

that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the

magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves

for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the

law is not made about a religious, but a political matter; nor is the

sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.

By this we see what difference there is between the Church and the

Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be prohibited

by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his

subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by

him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully

take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own house, the law

ought not to abridge him of the same liberty in his religious worship;

though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very different and be

there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But

those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their

ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those things ought not

to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought

always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority to the

oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.

It may be said: “What if a Church be idolatrous, is that also to be

tolerated by the magistrate?” I answer: What power can be given to the

magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which may not in

time and place be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it must be

remembered that the civil power is the same everywhere, and the religion of

every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore, such a power be granted

unto the civil magistrate in spirituals as that at Geneva, for example, he

may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there reputed

idolatrous, by the same rule another magistrate, in some neighbouring

country, may oppress the reformed religion and, in India, the Christian. The

civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the

prince’s pleasure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to

introduce anything into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there

can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the same manner be lawful to

alter everything, according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has

framed unto himself. No man whatsoever ought, therefore, to be deprived of

his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion. Not even Americans,

subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or

goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that

they please God in observing the rites of their own country and that they

shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left unto God and

themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An

inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything,

arrive in a Pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the

bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of

life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they

all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The Christian

religion by this means takes root in that country and spreads itself, but

does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition

peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At

length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party

becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken,

all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless

these innocent Pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and the law

of Nature and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say,

unless they will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new and

strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their

forefathers and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then, at last, it appears

what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to

produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls,

serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by

laws, punishments, fire, and sword, may apply this story to himself. For the

reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither Pagans

there, nor any dissenting Christians here, can, with any right, be deprived

of their worldly goods by the predominating faction of a court-church; nor

are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of

religion in one place more than another.

But idolatry, say some, is a sin and therefore not to be tolerated. If they

said it were therefore to be avoided, the inference were good. But it does

not follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to be punished by the

magistrate. For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his

sword in punishing everything, indifferently, that he takes to be a sin

against God. Covetousness, uncharitableness, idleness, and many other things

are sins by the consent of men, which yet no man ever said were to be

punished by the magistrate. The reason is because they are not prejudicial

to other men’s rights, nor do they break the public peace of societies. Nay,

even the sins of lying and perjury are nowhere punishable by laws; unless,

in certain cases, in which the real turpitude of the thing and the offence

against God are not considered, but only the injury done unto men’s

neighbours and to the commonwealth. And what if in another country, to a

Mahometan or a Pagan prince, the Christian religion seem false and offensive

to God; may not the Christians for the same reason, and after the same

manner, be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther that, by the law of Moses, idolaters were to be

rooted out. True, indeed, by the law of Moses; but that is not obligatory to

us Christians. Nobody pretends that everything generally enjoined by the law

of Moses ought to be practised by Christians; but there is nothing more

frivolous than that common distinction of moral, judicial, and ceremonial

law, which men ordinarily make use of. For no positive law whatsoever can

oblige any people but those to whom it is given. “Hear, O Israel,”

sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to that

people. And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge

the authority of the law of Moses for the inflicting of capital punishment

upon idolaters. But, however, I will examine this argument a little more

particularly.

The case of idolaters, in respect of the Jewish commonwealth, falls under a

double consideration. The first is of those who, being initiated in the

Mosaical rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards

apostatise from the worship of the God of Israel. These were proceeded

against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high treason. For the

commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute

theocracy; nor was there, or could there be, any difference between that

commonwealth and the Church. The laws established there concerning the

worship of One Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people and a part

of their political government, in which God Himself was the legislator. Now,

if any one can shew me where there is a commonwealth at this time,

constituted upon that foundation, I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical

laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil, and that the subjects

of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict conformity with

that Church by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing under

the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth. There are, indeed, many cities and

kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ, but they have retained

their ancient form of government, with which the law of Christ hath not at

all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good works, they

may obtain eternal life; but He instituted no commonwealth. He prescribed

unto His followers no new and peculiar form of government, nor put He the

sword into any magistrate’s hand, with commission to make use of it in

forcing men to forsake their former religion and receive His.

Secondly, foreigners and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of

Israel were not compelled by force to observe the rites of the Mosaical law;

but, on the contrary, in the very same place where it is ordered that an

Israelite that was an idolater should be put to death,[7] there it is

provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed. I confess that

the seven nations that possessed the land which was promised to the

Israelites were utterly to be cut off; but this was not singly because they

were idolaters. For if that had been the reason, why were the Moabites and

other nations to be spared? No: the reason is this. God being in a peculiar

manner the King of the Jews, He could not suffer the adoration of any other

deity (which was properly an act of high treason against Himself) in the

land of Canaan, which was His kingdom. For such a manifest revolt could no

ways consist with His dominion, which was perfectly political in that

country. All idolatry was, therefore, to be rooted out of the bounds of His

kingdom because it was an acknowledgment of another god, that is say,

another king, against the laws of Empire. The inhabitants were also to be

driven out, that the entire possession of the land might be given to the

Israelites. And for the like reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out

of their countries by the children of Esau and Lot; and their lands, upon

the same grounds, given by God to the invaders.[8] But, though all idolatry

was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater was not

brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole nation of the

Gibeonites, articled with Joshua, and were allowed by treaty; and there were

many captives amongst the Jews who were idolaters. David and Solomon subdued

many countries without the confines of the Land of Promise and carried their

conquests as far as Euphrates. Amongst so many captives taken, so many

nations reduced under their obedience, we find not one man forced into the

Jewish religion and the worship of the true God and punished for idolatry,

though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one, indeed, becoming

a proselyte, desired to be made a denizen of their commonwealth, he was

obliged to submit to their laws; that is, to embrace their religion. But

this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by constraint. He did not

unwillingly submit, to show his obedience, but he sought and solicited for

it as a privilege. And, as soon as he was admitted, he became subject to the

laws of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was forbidden within the

borders of the land of Canaan. But that law (as I have said) did not reach

to any of those regions, however subjected unto the Jews, that were situated

without those bounds.

Thus far concerning outward worship. Let us now consider articles of faith.

The articles of religion are some of them practical and some speculative.

Now, though both sorts consist in the knowledge of truth, yet these

terminate simply in the understanding, those influence the will and manners.

Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith (as they are called)

which are required only to be believed, cannot be imposed on any Church by

the law of the land. For it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws

which are not in men’s power to perform. And to believe this or that to be

true does not depend upon our will. But of this enough has been said

already. “But.” will some say; “let men at least profess that they believe.”

A sweet religion, indeed, that obliges men to dissemble and tell lies, both

to God and man, for the salvation of their souls! If the magistrate thinks

to save men thus, he seems to understand little of the way of salvation. And

if he does it not in order to save them, why is he so solicitous about the

articles of faith as to enact them by a law?

Further, the magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or professing of

any speculative opinions in any Church because they have no manner of

relation to the civil rights of the subjects. If a Roman Catholic believe

that to be really the body of Christ which another man calls bread, he does

no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew do not believe the New

Testament to be the Word of God, he does not thereby alter anything in men’s

civil rights. If a heathen doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to

be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magistrate and the

estates of the people may be equally secure whether any man believe these

things or no. I readily grant that these opinions are false and absurd. But

the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for

the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s

goods and person. And so it ought to be. For the truth certainly would do

well enough if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has

received and, I fear, never will receive much assistance from the power of

great men, to whom she is but rarely known and more rarely welcome. She is

not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance

into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by the assistance of foreign

and borrowed succours. But if Truth makes not her way into the understanding

by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence

can add to her. Thus much for speculative opinions. Let us now proceed to

practical ones.

A good life, in which consist not the least part of religion and true piety,

concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety both of men’s

souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong, therefore, to the

jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and

domestic governor; I mean both of the magistrate and conscience. Here,

therefore, is great danger, lest one of these jurisdictions intrench upon

the other, and discord arise between the keeper of the public peace and the

overseers of souls. But if what has been already said concerning the limits

of both these governments be rightly considered, it will easily remove all

difficulty in this matter.

Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery;

whose happiness depending upon his believing and doing those things in this

life which are necessary to the obtaining of God’s favour, and are

prescribed by God to that end. It follows from thence, first, that the

observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon mankind

and that our utmost care, application, and diligence ought to be exercised

in the search and performance of them; because there is nothing in this

world that is of any consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly,

that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous

opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to

another man’s affairs, therefore, the care of each man’s salvation belongs

only to himself. But I would not have this understood as if I meant hereby

to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce

men from errors, which are indeed the greatest duty of a Christian. Any one

may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the

promoting of another man’s salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be

forborne. Nothing is to be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that

matter to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another,

further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the supreme and

absolute authority of judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody

else is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct

therein.

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal

lives here upon earth; the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the

duration uncertain, they have need of several outward conveniences to the

support thereof, which are to be procured or preserved by pains and

industry. For those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of

our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer

themselves fit and prepared for our use. This part, therefore, draws on

another care and necessarily gives another employment. But the pravity of

mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of

other men’s labours than take pains to provide for themselves, the necessity

of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already

acquired and also of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may

acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into society with one

another, that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each

other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and

happiness of this life, leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of

his own eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated

by another man’s industry, nor can the loss of it turn to another man’s

prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence.

But, forasmuch as men thus entering into societies, grounded upon their

mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their temporal goods, may,

nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their

fellow citizens, or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of

this evil consists in arms, riches, and multitude of citizens; the remedy of

the other in laws; and the care of all things relating both to one and the

other is committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the

original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the legislative

(which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision

may be made for the security of each man’s private possessions; for the

peace, riches, and public commodities of the whole people; and, as much as

possible, for the increase of their inward strength against foreign

invasions.

These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the

legislative power ought to be directed and by what measures regulated; and

that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society; which is

the sole reason of men’s entering into society, and the only thing they seek

and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in

reference to their eternal salvation, and that is that every one should do

what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on

whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness. For

obedience is due, in the first place, to God and, afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask: “What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his

authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private person?” I

answer that, if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of

the magistrates be indeed directed to the public good, this will seldom

happen. But if, perhaps, it do so fall out, I say, that such a private

person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to

undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the

private judgement of any person concerning a law enacted in political

matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law,

nor deserve a dispensation. But if the law, indeed, be concerning things

that lie not within the verge of the magistrate’s authority (as, for

example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to

embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of

another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against

their consciences. For the political society is instituted for no other end,

but only to secure every man’s possession of the things of this life. The

care of each man’s soul and of the things of heaven, which neither does

belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to

every man’s self. Thus the safeguard of men’s lives and of the things that

belong unto this life is the business of the commonwealth; and the

preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate.

And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this

man or party and give them to that; nor change propriety amongst fellow

subjects (no not even by a law), for a cause that has no relation to the end

of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or

false does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow subjects,

which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for the public

good? I answer: As the private judgement of any particular person, if

erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law, so the private

judgement (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not give him any new

right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the

constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the

people to grant, much less if he make it his business to enrich and advance

his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what if

the magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws and that they

are for the public good, and his subjects believe the contrary? Who shall be

judge between them? I answer: God alone. For there is no judge upon earth

between the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say, is the only judge

in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day according to

his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in

endeavouring to promote piety, and the public weal, and peace of mankind.

But What shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and chief

care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next place,

of the public peace; though yet there are very few will think it is peace

there, where they see all laid waste.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the

other by force; and these are of that nature that where the one ends, the

other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of

the magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what

usually happens where controversies arise without a judge to determine them.

You will say, then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and

carry his point. Without doubt; but the question is not here concerning the

doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions contrary to human

society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of

civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these, indeed,

examples in any Church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to such a

degree of madness as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of

religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society and

are, therefore, condemned by the judgement of all mankind; because their own

interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when

men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar

prerogative covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in

effect opposite to the civil right of the community. For example: we cannot

find any sect that teaches, expressly and openly, that men are not obliged

to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ

from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to

themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon

draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate and awaken all the care of

the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an

evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other

words. What else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with

heretics? Their meaning, forsooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith

belongs unto themselves; for they declare all that are not of their

communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they

think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting that kings

excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms? It is evident that they

thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they

challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their

hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also an assertion by which

those that maintain it do plainly lay claim to the possession of all things.

For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe, or at least as

not to profess themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These,

therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and

orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege

or power above other mortals, in civil concernments; or who upon pretence of

religion do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not

associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion, I say these have no

right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will not own

and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For

what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are

ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and possess themselves of

the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects; and that they only ask

leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so long until they find themselves

strong enough to effect it?

Again: That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which

is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do

thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of

another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the

settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own

people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government.

Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the

Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; especially when both the one

and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same

person, who has not only power to persuade the members of his Church to

whatsoever he lists, either as purely religious, or in order thereunto, but

can also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any

one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in

everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the

same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the

Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman

Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his

pleasure. But this Mahometan living amongst Christians would yet more

apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to

be head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.

Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God.

Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can

have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in

thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine

and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to

challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions,

though not absolutely free from all error, if they do not tend to establish

domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church in which they are

taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated.

It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies which, being

vulgarly called and perhaps having sometimes been conventicles and nurseries

of factions and seditions, are thought to afford against this doctrine of

toleration. But this has not happened by anything peculiar unto the genius

of such assemblies, but by the unhappy circumstances of an oppressed or

ill-settled liberty. These accusations would soon cease if the law of

toleration were once so settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down

toleration as the foundation of their own liberty, and teach that liberty of

conscience is every man’s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters as

to themselves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion

either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would take away

all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience; and these

causes of discontents and animosities being once removed, there would remain

nothing in these assemblies that were not more peaceable and less apt to

produce disturbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever. But let

us examine particularly the heads of these accusations.

You will say that assemblies and meetings endanger the public peace and

threaten the commonwealth. I answer: If this be so, why are there daily such

numerous meetings in markets and Courts of Judicature? Why are crowds upon

the Exchange and a concourse of people in cities suffered? You will reply:

“Those are civil assemblies, but these we object against are

ecclesiastical.” I answer: It is a likely thing, indeed, that such

assemblies as are altogether remote from civil affairs should be most apt to

embroil them. Oh, but civil assemblies are composed of men that differ from

one another in matters of religion, but these ecclesiastical meetings are of

persons that are all of one opinion. As if an agreement in matters of

religion were in effect a conspiracy against the commonwealth; or as if men

would not be so much the more warmly unanimous in religion the less liberty

they had of assembling. But it will be urged still that civil assemblies are

open and free for any one to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are

more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations. I

answer that this is not strictly true, for many civil assemblies are not

open to everyone. And if some religious meetings be private, who are they (I

beseech you) that are to be blamed for it, those that desire, or those that

forbid their being public! Again, you will say that religious communion does

exceedingly unite men’s minds and affections to one another and is therefore

the more dangerous. But if this be so, why is not the magistrate afraid of

his own Church; and why does he not forbid their assemblies as things

dangerous to his Government? You will say because he himself is a part and

even the head of them. As if he were not also a part of the commonwealth, and

the head of the whole people!

Let us therefore deal plainly. The magistrate is afraid of other Churches,

but not of his own, because he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe

and cruel to the other. These he treats like children, and indulges them

even to wantonness. Those he uses as slaves and, how blamelessly soever they

demean themselves, recompenses them no otherwise than by galleys, prisons,

confiscations, and death. These he cherishes and defends; those he

continually scourges and oppresses. Let him turn the tables. Or let those

dissenters enjoy but the same privileges in civils as his other subjects,

and he will quickly find that these religious meetings will be no longer

dangerous. For if men enter into seditious conspiracies, it is not religion

inspires them to it in their meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions

that make them willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate governments are

everywhere quiet, everywhere safe; but oppression raises ferments and makes

men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that

seditions are very frequently raised upon pretence of religion, but it is as

true that for religion subjects are frequently ill treated and live

miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made proceed not from any peculiar

temper of this or that Church or religious society, but from the common

disposition of all mankind, who when they groan under any heavy burthen

endeavour naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppose

this business of religion were let alone, and that there were some other

distinction made between men and men upon account of their different

complexions, shapes, and features, so that those who have black hair (for

example) or grey eyes should not enjoy the same privileges as other

citizens; that they should not be permitted either to buy or sell, or live

by their callings; that parents should not have the government and education

of their own children; that all should either be excluded from the benefit

of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be doubted but these

persons, thus distinguished from others by the colour of their hair and

eyes, and united together by one common persecution, would be as dangerous

to the magistrate as any others that had associated themselves merely upon

the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and profit,

others for want of business have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins

some and religion others. But there is only one thing which gathers people

into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.

You will say “What, will you have people to meet at divine service against

the magistrate’s will?” I answer: Why, I pray, against his will? Is it not

both lawful and necessary that they should meet? Against his will, do you

say? That is what I complain of; that is the very root of all the mischief.

Why are assemblies less sufferable in a church than in a theatre or market?

Those that meet there are not either more vicious or more turbulent than

those that meet elsewhere. The business in that is that they are ill used,

and therefore they are not to be suffered. Take away the partiality that is

used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the

penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately

become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the religion of the

magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the

peace of the commonwealth as their condition is better in that place than

elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many

guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be

innovated or changed in the form of the government, because they can hope

for nothing better than what they already enjoy — that is, an equal

condition with their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government.

Now if that Church which agrees in religion with the prince be esteemed the

chief support of any civil government, and that for no other reason (as has

already been shown) than because the prince is kind and the laws are

favourable to it, how much greater will be the security of government where

all good subjects, of whatsoever Church they be, without any distinction upon

account of religion, enjoying the same favour of the prince and the same

benefit of the laws, shall become the common support and guard of it, and

where none will have any occasion to fear the severity of the laws but those

that do injuries to their neighbours and offend against the civil peace?

That we may draw towards a conclusion. The sum of all we drive at is that

every man may enjoy the same rights that are granted to others. Is it

permitted to worship God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted to do it

in the Geneva form also. Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market-place?

Let those that have a mind to it be permitted to do it also in the Church.

Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel, stand, sit, or use any

other posture; and to clothe himself in white or black, in short or in long

garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink wine, or wash with

water in the church. In a word, whatsoever things are left free by law in

the common occasions of life, let them remain free unto every Church in

divine worship. Let no man’s life, or body, or house, or estate, suffer any

manner of prejudice upon these accounts. Can you allow of the Presbyterian

discipline? Why should not the Episcopal also have what they like?

Ecclesiastical authority, whether it be administered by the hands of a

single person or many, is everywhere the same; and neither has any

jurisdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power of compulsion, nor

anything at all to do with riches and revenues.

Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by daily experience and

public allowance. These are allowed to people of some one persuasion; why

not to all? If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary

to the public peace, it is to be punished in the same manner and no

otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market. These meetings

ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and flagitious fellows. Nor ought

it to be less lawful for men to meet in churches than in halls; nor are one

part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for their meeting together

than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions, and no man

is to be laid under a suspicion or odium for the fault of another. Those

that are seditious, murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, slanderers,

etc., of whatsoever Church, whether national or not, ought to be punished

and suppressed. But those whose doctrine is peaceable and whose manners are

pure and blameless ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects.

Thus if solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public worship be

permitted to any one sort of professors, all these things ought to be

permitted to the Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians,

Quakers, and others, with the same liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak the

truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor

Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because

of his religion. The Gospel commands no such thing. The Church which

“judgeth not those that are without”[9] wants it not. And the commonwealth,

which embraces indifferently all men that are honest, peaceable, and

industrious, requires it not. Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with

us, and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow

the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not

allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false, their worship

more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered by their meeting in

public than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to

Jews and Pagans, surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be

worse than theirs in a Christian commonwealth.

You will say, perhaps: “Yes, it ought to be; because they are more

inclinable to factions, tumults, and civil wars.” I answer: Is this the

fault of the Christian religion? If it be so, truly the Christian religion

is the worst of all religions and ought neither to be embraced by any

particular person, nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the

genius, this the nature of the Christian religion, to be turbulent and

destructive to the civil peace, that Church itself which the magistrate

indulges will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to say any such

thing of that religion which carries the greatest opposition to

covetousness, ambition, discord, contention, and all manner of inordinate

desires, and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was. We

must, therefore, seek another cause of those evils that are charged upon

religion. And, if we consider right, we shall find it to consist wholly in

the subject that I am treating of. It is not the diversity of opinions

(which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are

of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all

the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of

religion. The heads and leaders of the Church, moved by avarice and

insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the immoderate ambition of

magistrates and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude, have

incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves, by

preaching unto them, contrary to the laws of the Gospel and to the precepts

of charity, that schismatics and heretics are to be outed of their

possessions and destroyed. And thus have they mixed together and confounded

two things that are in themselves most different, the Church and the

commonwealth. Now as it is very difficult for men patiently to suffer

themselves to be stripped of the goods which they have got by their honest

industry, and, contrary to all the laws of equity, both human and divine, to

be delivered up for a prey to other men’s violence and rapine; especially

when they are otherwise altogether blameless; and that the occasion for

which they are thus treated does not at all belong to the jurisdiction of

the magistrate, but entirely to the conscience of every particular man for

the conduct of which he is accountable to God only; what else can be

expected but that these men, growing weary of the evils under which they

labour, should in the end think it lawful for them to resist force with

force, and to defend their natural rights (which are not forfeitable upon

account of religion) with arms as well as they can? That this has been

hitherto the ordinary course of things is abundantly evident in history, and

that it will continue to be so hereafter is but too apparent in reason. It

cannot indeed, be otherwise so long as the principle of persecution for

religion shall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with magistrate and people,

and so long as those that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord

shall continue with all their art and strength to excite men to arms and

sound the trumpet of war. But that magistrates should thus suffer these

incendiaries and disturbers of the public peace might justly be wondered at

if it did not appear that they have been invited by them unto a

participation of the spoil, and have therefore thought fit to make use of

their covetousness and pride as means whereby to increase their own power.

For who does not see that these good men are, indeed, more ministers of the

government than ministers of the Gospel and that, by flattering the ambition

and favouring the dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour

with all their might to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth which

otherwise they should not be able to establish in the Church? This is the

unhappy agreement that we see between the Church and State. Whereas if each

of them would contain itself within its own bounds — the one attending to

the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls

– it is impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them.

Sed pudet hoec opprobria. etc. God Almighty grant, I beseech Him, that the

gospel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magistrates,

growing more careful to conform their own consciences to the law of God and

less solicitous about the binding of other men’s consciences by human laws,

may, like fathers of their country, direct all their counsels and endeavours

to promote universally the civil welfare of all their children, except only

of such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their brethren; and

that all ecclesiastical men, who boast themselves to be the successors of the

Apostles, walking peaceably and modestly in the Apostles’ steps, without

intermeddling with State Affairs, may apply themselves wholly to promote the

salvation of souls.

FAREWELL.

PERHAPS it may not be amiss to add a few things concerning heresy and

schism. A Turk is not, nor can be, either heretic or schismatic to a

Christian; and if any man fall off from the Christian faith to Mahometism,

he does not thereby become a heretic or schismatic, but an apostate and an

infidel. This nobody doubts of; and by this it appears that men of different

religions cannot be heretics or schismatics to one another.

We are to inquire, therefore, what men are of the same religion. Concerning

which it is manifest that those who have one and the same rule of faith and

worship are of the same religion; and those who have not the same rule of

faith and worship are of different religions. For since all things that

belong unto that religion are contained in that rule, it follows necessarily

that those who agree in one rule are of one and the same religion, and vice

versa. Thus Turks and Christians are of different religions, because these

take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion, and those the

Alcoran. And for the same reason there may be different religions also even

amongst Christians. The Papists and Lutherans, though both of them profess

faith in Christ and are therefore called Christians, yet are not both of the

same religion, because these acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to

be the rule and foundation of their religion, those take in also traditions

and the decrees of Popes and of these together make the rule of their

religion; and thus the Christians of St. John (as they are called) and the

Christians of Geneva are of different religions, because these also take

only the Scriptures, and those I know not what traditions, for the rule of

their religion.

This being settled, it follows, first, that heresy is a separation made in

ecclesiastical communion between men of the same religion for some opinions

no way contained in the rule itself; and, secondly, that amongst those who

acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith,

heresy is a separation made in their Christian communion for opinions not

contained in the express words of Scripture. Now this separation may be made

in a twofold manner:

1. When the greater part, or by the magistrate’s patronage the stronger

part, of the Church separates itself from others by excluding them out of

her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions

which are not the express words of the Scripture. For it is not the paucity

of those that are separated, nor the authority of the magistrate, that can

make any man guilty of heresy, but he only is a heretic who divides the

Church into parts, introduces names and marks of distinction, and

voluntarily makes a separation because of such opinions.

2. When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because

that Church does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy

Scriptures do not expressly teach.

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals, and they err

obstinately against knowledge; for when they have determined the Holy

Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they nevertheless lay down

certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture, and

because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs, nor

build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental, they therefore

make a separation in the Church, either by withdrawing themselves from

others, or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for

them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture

and to the analogy of faith; for if they be conceived in the express words

of Scripture, there can be no question about them, because those things are

acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore

fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they require to be

professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture, it is undoubtedly

well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so

agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude

those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable

doctrines of the Scripture; and to make a separation for such things as

these, which neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become heretics; for

I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he

dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as divine

inspirations and compare the articles of faith that he has framed according

to his own fancy with the authority of Scripture. I know there are some

propositions so evidently agreeable to Scripture that nobody can deny them

to be drawn from thence, but about those, therefore, there can be no

difference. This only I say — that however clearly we may think this or the

other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to

impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it

to be agreeable to the rule of faith, unless we would be content also that

other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner, and that we

should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and

contradictory opinions of Lutherans, Calvinists, Remonstrants, Anabaptists,

and other sects which the contrivers of symbols, systems, and confessions

are accustomed to deliver to their followers as genuine and necessary

deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant

arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things

necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and

infinite wisdom of God.

Thus much concerning heresy, which word in common use is applied only to the

doctrinal part of religion. Let us now consider schism, which is a crime

near akin to it; for both these words seem unto me to signify an

ill-grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not

necessary. But since use, which is the supreme law in matter of language,

has determined that heresy relates to errors in faith, and schism to those

in worship or discipline, we must consider them under that distinction.

Schism, then, for the same reasons that have already been alleged, is

nothing else but a separation made in the communion of the Church upon

account of something in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is

not any necessary part of it. Now, nothing in worship or discipline can be

necessary to Christian communion but what Christ our legislator, or the

Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in express words.

In a word, he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in

express words, nor makes a separation upon occasion of anything that is not

manifestly contained in the sacred text — however he may be nicknamed by

any sect of Christians and declared by some or all of them to be utterly

void of true Christianity — yet in deed and in truth this man cannot be

either a heretic or schismatic.

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously,

but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your

parts.

Notes:

1. Luke 22. 25.

2. II Tim. 2. 19.

3. Luke 22. 32.

4. Rom. I.

5. Gal. 5.

6. Matt. 18. 20.

7. Exod. 22, 20, 21.

8. Deut. 2.

9. I Cor. 5. 12, 13.

The fact is that in a really distorted way, the article it correct that facts don’t generally change anyone’s mind, and then it exemplifies why facts don’t change anyone’s mind… by throwing out several non-facts and inferring in the end that normal people just can’t handle the responsibility of democracy… because of the non-facts that the author throws out as facts.

             So, I’ll start with the few ‘facts’ that this article throws out as facts that so called conservatives take issue with;

1. “In 2005, amid the strident calls for better media fact-checking in the wake of the Iraq war, Michigan’s Nyhan and a colleague devised an experiment in which participants were given mock news stories, each of which contained a provably false, though nonetheless widespread, claim made by a political figure: that there were WMDs found in Iraq (there weren’t), “
   1. Well… the (there weren’t), part isn’t exactly true. There were MWD’s found in Iraq, there were MWD manufacturing and research facilities found in Iraq, and there was evidence that large quantities of WMD’s were transported out of Iraq, however… there were NOT the large quantities of WMD’s found that the entire world’s intelligence agencies thought were there. But to say flatly that “there weren’t” any WMD’s in Iraq… is wrong.
2. “that the Bush tax cuts increased government revenues (revenues actually fell)”
   1. That statement is patently false… Government revenues did rise. President Bush took office in 2001, in a year in which government revenues were steeply falling.

Year     GDP-US          Total Revenue-fed       

1999    9353.5             1827.64           a

2000    9951.5             2025.46           a

2001    10286.2           1991.43           a

2002    10642.3           1853.40           a

2003    11142.1           1782.53           a

2004    11867.8           1880.28           a

2005    12638.4           2153.86           a

2006    13398.9           2407.25           a

2007    14077.6           2568.00           a

2008    14441.4           2524.00           a

2009    14258.2           2105.00           a

2010    14623.9           2165.12           b

Legend:

 a – actual reported

 b – budgeted estimate in US fy11 budget

Now, as the actual numbers show… revenues peaked in 2000, a year before Bush took office, then dropped precipitously until… by God… until 2004, the fiscal year following the full implementation of Bush’s tax cuts. (Please do not take this as a defense of Bush at all… because while his tax cuts did raise revenues… his spending outpaced his revenue increases dramatically)

            So, two ‘facts’… that according to this article claims that so called ‘conservatives’ were so defensive about… weren’t even facts at all, but misrepresentations of facts.

            Is it any wonder why so many people disbelieve these so called ‘facts’??

            Then the article continues with this, ‘It’s unclear what is driving the behavior — it could range from simple defensiveness, to people working harder to defend their initial beliefs — but as Nyhan dryly put it, “It’s hard to be optimistic about the effectiveness of fact-checking.”’

            Well, to the trained eye it is simple what the driving behavior is. I divide it up into two areas, agenda and simple values.

1. Agenda… people have agendas to push. Everyone has agendas to push… from Katie Couric interviewing Sarah Palin to Sean Hannity interviewing Sarah Palin. The media, whether it’s CNN, Fox News, MSNBC to your evening news… they all have an agenda.

I have an agenda… only I freely admit that I have an agenda, and I’ll state my agenda openly an honestly. That is one of the few things that I think sets me apart from many others…

… other people cloak their agendas in the language of intellectual elitism and behavioral studies, etc.

Politicians wrap their agendas in GAO studies, CBO projections, economist speak, and greater good… and need and… my personal favorite, it’s for the children…

And of course, these ‘Fact Checkers’… themselves have agenda’s. Factcheck.org, MediaMatters.org and even to a slight degree… snopes.com all have agendas. Though snopes.com seems to have the least political agenda, factcheck.or mediamatters.org both have a steep political tilt and thus… their facts are about as reliable as the ones in this article.

                     2. Values… simple values. I’ll tell you what I value. I value individual liberty, namely my individual liberty and that of my children. I value your individual liberty, but not necessarily as much as my own, meaning… I’m not willing to let you swing your fist into my face for the sake of your liberty. Nor would I expect you to be willing to let me swing my fist in your face… or would I expect to party all the time and expect for you to pay for my house, run my business into the ground and expect you to bail me out.

That is what I value. I won’t make any bones about it. I don’t value your health-care. I don’t value your house. I don’t value your job… at least not as much as I value our liberty.

So, when faced with what may very well be absolute facts (for the sake of argument)… like that a new sweeping health-care bill might lower overall health-care costs and it might provide for a new Utopian society… at the cost of letting some bureaucrat to decide what kind of health-care I have…

… I’m going to completely ignore and disregard it. I don’t care.

            It’s not some flaw in my brain. It’s not a threat to democracy… it’s a simply difference in VALUES.

            So, take into account a difference in values, with the FACT that I recognize that like opinions and… well opinions… everyone has agendas, it’s no wonder why so called facts don’t seem to change people’s minds.

            There has never been a pundit or politician yet that has let facts get in the way of their opinions… and it would seem that very few of these studies or articles let facts get in the way of their ‘facts’ or conclusions.

Terror Experts Blast Obama for Dropping References to Islamic Extremism

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration’s recent move to drop rhetorical references to Islamic radicalism is drawing fire in a new report warning the decision ignores the role religion can play in motivating terrorists…

Then, the following article;

Bombers Kill 64 World Cup Fans in Uganda

“Uganda is one of our enemies. Whatever makes them cry, makes us happy. May Allah’s anger be upon those who are against us,” Sheik said.

What??? Let’s not forget the story from a couple days ago

NASA Chief: Next Frontier Better Relations With Muslim World

So, when wrapped up together… you just have to ask where the priorities are for these people?? Why the need for the Muslim/Islam hand job?

Don’t even get me started on the use of our military for rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan while there are a bunch of perfectly good terrorists (namely the above mentioned “May allah’s anger’ asshole) to kill.

http://video.foxnews.com/v/4277314/new-black-panther-party-head-responds-to-allegations/

Watch the latest video at video.foxnews.com

And the idea that we elect a ‘ruler’ just irritates the crap out of me.

I can’t speak for every American, but I thought that all Americans were created ‘equal, which means to me that I’ve got the same rights as any man or woman in America; be it Barack Obama or George Bush or Joe the Plumber. I don’t know about anyone else, but I take exception to the idea that anyone is going to ‘rule’ over me.

I learned growing up that part of being ‘American’ was the resistance to being ‘ruled’. From our Founding Fathers to John Wayne to Harley Davidson to Rock & Roll to Cowboys to the Alamo, hell the entire state of Texas… everything that I know about the spirit of America has its roots in not being ‘ruled’.

 I know, there has to be some people out there that don’t mind being ruled, and to you I’d like to offer you a minimum wage job at the local McDonalds.

For everyone else out there, how do you feel about being ruled over?

Now, that’s not to say we don’t need leaders in the country. While we have an abundance of people who want to be our rulers; we have a distinct lack of leaders in this country.

What’s the difference between a ruler and a leader?

A ruler will sit in Washington DC and tell Americans how to live their lives, how to run their businesses, how to treat their employees, what kind of healthcare they must carry, and what people can eat, drink, smoke, listen to, watch on TV, and eventually think.

A leader will live their own lives and be an example of how to live their lives, how to run their businesses, how to treat their employees, what kind of healthcare they must carry, and what people can eat, drink, smoke, listen to, watch on TV, and eventually think.

Let’s take Barack Obama for example. As a ruler, he wants to legislate that you and I provide healthcare for our neighbor. In order for his plans to work he has to get as many healthy people into the system to pay for the sick people, and he’s willing to use every power available to him to enact it (be they Constitutional powers or not). Now, as a leader, Mr. Barack Obama would take a percentage of his millions and encourage his millionaire friends like Warren Buffet to dip into their own fortunes and help out a few million people who need healthcare.

A ruler writes legislation that mandates that all business owners will provide healthcare for their employers, hire a certain percentage of women, minorities, gay, lesbians and/or transgendered employees, and make sure that their business has a zero carbon footprint. A leader just does it.

A leader will go out and simply do it, and I’d be the first one in line to support them. If Barack Obama were to take a couple million dollars of his own money… and maybe even a few million from his rich Hollywood friends… and start a business using only private money and running on the same principles that he wants to force on everyone in America (and if he made a good product) I’d be the first in line to support his business.

If Barack Obama were to vow to veto any Federal mandate for healthcare, but pony up a few million dollars of his own money (and a few million from his Hollywood friends) to simply provide healthcare for people who need it…

… I’d be first in line to campaign on his behalf.

Because that’s the difference between a leader and a ruler. Barack Obama wants to be a great ruler…

… and I for one don’t want to be ruled!!!

(and this isn’t a partisian issue. The Republicans are just as guilty as the Democrats are… they just want to be ‘ruler lites’)

BUT, I’m back… and hopefully I’ll be able to put out a few more lines.

Then, 50-60 years later, the term ‘liberal’ started to lose its shine so, the progressives have started calling themselves ‘progressives’ again.

Not that they’re all that ‘progressive’. They want to ‘progress’ from the industrial world back to an agrarian world. They want to ‘progress’ from a world that embraces individual liberty and freedom back to a world of serfdom and dependency on the state, not unlike the feudal system that Europe was in until the United States of America smashed over 200 years ago. That’s not ‘progressive’, that ‘regressive’.

I try to avoid speaking for anyone else, but I don’t care to go back to farming my own little plot of land that was allotted to me by any lord, but I digress.

I’m still not thrilled with the term progressive, but that’s their term, so we’ll let them have it, but we should be clear in the fact that these people are going to ‘progress’ us right back into the dark ages… but that’s their term.

It should be noted that every ‘progressive’ regime that the world has ever known has led to an oligarchy. Even here in the United States, we have certain families, whether they’re the Clintons, the Kennedys, or the Bushs, we have a certain small percentage of the population that enjoys the power to decide for the rest of us. In Korea they have Kim jung il; in Russia, Putin; in China they have the ‘party’. All around the world, you can change the names and the nation, but there is little difference between the progressives of today and the lords and ladies of the middle ages. There’s also no difference between the great unwashed masses of today and the surfs and peons of days gone by.

The point is that progressivism is regressive. The progressives have created a caste system, where people of certain classes are set in a caste system. Notice the lines drawn by progressives between the rich and the ‘middle class’, and which oddly enough seem to exclude the political class from the evil rich class.

That, for reference, is how I define ‘Progressive’, which can be interchanged relatively easily with ‘Liberal’ and occasionally ‘Socialist’ and/or ‘Fascist’. 

We didn’t always have Social Security. It was originally a ‘New Deal’, Depression era program that was passed in August of 1935 and didn’t go in effect until several years later. It was originally set up as a welfare program for old, disabled and unemployed. I really doubt that even those that voted for it intended to be a burden to their great-grandchildren. At the time, it was a program to help the old and needed… and who could argue against helping the old and the needy?

Originally, the Social Security (aka OASDI & HI) tax was only 2% (1% from you and 1% from your boss for you). Now, 74 years later it’s only up to 15.3% (7.65% from you and 7.65% from your boss for you). Now, what kind of selfish person would argue with chipping in 2% of their income to help the poor and elderly? That argument goes a long way until that 2% grows to more than 15%.

Even the argument at 15% might go a little way, until you find out that 15% isn’t even going to be enough to cover what the government is owes in a very few years. That means that our kids aren’t going to be looking at 15%. They’re going to pay progressively more and more every year as more old people retire (and sit on their ass for 20 years drawing welfare), and the ratio between those who are paying into Social Security and those who are collecting Social Security gets smaller and smaller.

So, that really old person that voted for Social Security, and all of their good intentions, have really left a major screwed up mess for their great-grandchildren great-great-grandchildren.

Now, this as much as I’d love to talk about the royal screw-up called Social Security, this isn’t about Social Security. It’s more about the fact that my great-grandparents passed a program off onto me, that I don’t want, and I didn’t get a say about it. I didn’t get a vote on Social Security.

Did you?

Now, I really don’t care about your specific view on Social Security. I’d just like to hear from anyone who’s paying for it, that didn’t get a vote on it… and happy about it (‘IT’ being the fact that you did NOT get a vote for it).

Now, here is the real rub, and the point that I’ve been working towards… we’re ready to do the same thing to our children and grandchildren (and great-grandchildren) this healthcare system is going to be nearly ‘free’, not unlike the great-grandparents who only voted for a mere 2% tax that’s now grown to more than 15% (and will soon grow to more than 15%).

Even IF (and that’s a mighty big IF) these programs, like healthcare, cap-n-trade or whatever the program of the week is, didn’t grow out of control (like most government programs do) what kind of people impose these programs on their descendants who don’t have a say in it, but will be saddled with it.

Is that no better than the taxation without representation that we rebelled from England for?

How about… having a little foresight. Once these programs are in place, and once people get the idea that they’re ‘entitled’ to these programs, they’re impossible to rescind. Instead of imposing upon our children, a program that they’ll never be able to free themselves from, and our children will never get a say-so on, find a way to take care of ourselves without enslaving our kids.

How about… giving our children the respect that our great-grandparents didn’t have for us.

I don’t want to be sitting here in 50 years and have my grandkids mad at me because we made a decision for them, that they didn’t get a say in.

I don’t really want to get slapped by my grandkids because I loaded them up with bills that I ran up in their name. (and if my kids are any indication what my grandkids will be like, I’d be in trouble)